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ABSTRACT
In 2019 CAPMAS released a report estimating the percentage of extreme poverty amongst the
Egyptian public at 32.5%; one in every three Egyptian lives on 1.45$ a day. In 2017 a United
Nations report highlighted that on average 40,000 Egyptian died because of pollution. Those
figures represent the consequences of a cumulative “development” process that encompassed the
economic, political and legal fields. In particular, the thesis focuses on the role of the New
Commercial Law in disadvantaging vulnerable segments of the population and leading them to
prison. I argue that the use of law as a tool of development in the context of neo-liberal reform has
led to paradoxical outcomes that contributed to the underdevelopment of Egypt. Legal reforms
under the umbrella of the liberal “rule of law” constitute the laws of poverty. This research sheds
light on the role of “rule of law” as a pathway to economic development. It argues that “rule of
law” projects must be designed with consideration to distributional outcomes. Those distributional
outcomes could lead to creditor having the power to call upon the state to jail a debtor, they can
also result in favoring certain economic sectors over others(non productive visa vis productive).
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I.

Introduction: Egypt’s Development Puzzle and The Rule of Law
In 2019 CAPMAS released a report estimating the percentage of extreme poverty

amongst the Egyptian public at 32.5%; one in every three Egyptian lives on 1.45$ a day1. In
2017 a United Nations report highlighted that on average 40,000 Egyptian died because of
pollution2. Another report by WHO published in 2015 ranked Cairo as the second most polluted
city in the world(This report is contested by the Ministry of Environment)3. Those figures
represent the consequences of a cumulative “development” process that encompassed the
economic, political and legal fields. The aim of this thesis is to trace and analyze certain
developments in the legal field that are correlated to development studies and economics. The
extent and nature of that relationship will be determined based on the interaction between those
three disciplines. The attempt here in the words of prof. David Kennedy is to forge “an alliance
of heterogeneous traditions from economics, law and other disciplines to understand
development.”4
A normative definition of development that I thought would be fitting to adopt is in this
thesis is provided by prof. Allot “I see development as the enhancement of life and of life’s
possibilities for the ordinary individual”5. By legal developments, I particularly focus on
structural changes associated with ERSAP. Although the bulk of developments in the Egyptian

1
32.5% of Egyptians live in extreme poverty: CAPMAS EgyptToday,
https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/73437/32-5-of-Egyptians-live-in-extreme-poverty-CAPMAS (last visited
Apr 9, 2020)
2
Cairo’s bad breath, UN Environment (2017), https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/cairos-badbreath (last visited Apr 17, 2020).
3
Cairo is world's second most polluted city: WHO - Egypt Independent, Egypt Independent (2017),
https://egyptindependent.com/cairo-is-worlds-second-most-polluted-city-who/ (last visited Apr 17, 2020).
See also Is Cairo the world’s most polluted city? ‘No’ says the government, ‘probably’ say its suffering residents,
Arab News (2017), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1368046/middle-east (last visited Apr 17, 2020).
4
Taken from David Kennedy’s Syllabus for Law and Development accessible at http://iglp.law.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/LawAndDevoSyllabusFall2010.pdf
5
Law and development: facing complexity in the 21st century: essays in honour of Peter Slinn, (John Hatchard,
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, & Peter Slinn eds), (2003) at xii

legal system were conducted during the 1990s, certain developments were the product of the
Infitah period during Sadat’s era.
The Egyptian economy has witnessed since the abolishment of the monarchy varying
strategies of economic development. Each economic strategy was accompanied by a change in
both the political and legal systems. Each strategy has produced winners and losers and had an
impact on the economic indicators. Judging from the hike in poverty levels reported earlier; it
would seem that the losers far outnumber the winners, with the former’s numbers and well-being
declining. The economic performance of Egypt can be considered to be a puzzle. The country
has an abundance of labor force, access to mineral resources, agriculture, ethnic unity and even
at times of internal violence; the intensity of internal conflict has been low in comparison to the
region.
In order to engage with this puzzle, I have decided to engage with the role of law in
development. In particular, the role of law in the distribution of legal privileges that are assumed
to promote an inclusive development agenda. I argue that the use of law as a tool of development
in the context of neo-liberal reform has led to paradoxical outcomes that contributed to the
underdevelopment of Egypt. To quote prof. Sayed on the effect of neo-liberal policies mainly
propagated by IFIs and proponents “The institutional reforms associated with the neo-liberal
economic agenda tends to reinforce some of the same conditions that they are designed to
address”6. The institutional reforms discussed aim to universalize policy choices and bodies of
law. In this sense, rule of law projects that aim to privilege investors, businessmen and creditors
have led to a deterioration in living conditions of the majority of Egyptian. Legal reforms under

6

Hany Sayed, EBHRC Situated: An Essay on the Stakes of Research in Social Sciences, Summer 2013 EBHRC
(2013).
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the umbrella of rule of law constitute the laws of poverty. By inserting the role of law; I aim to
problematize the current conceptions for underdevelopment.
The thesis is split into three chapters; the first chapter has four aims: first it introduces the
history of Law and Development. Second, it examines how the neoliberal framework articulates
the role and function of the state, market and law. Third, it introduces the lenses of analysis used
in this thesis and in doing so it provides a theoretical critique to the neoliberal conception. This
critique operates to demystify and deconstruct the role of the “rule of law” in creating poverty
and inequality. This approach to law offers two insights; firstly, it flushes the active role of the
state as a function of neoliberal reforms (this simultaneously abolishes distinctions between the
public and the private realms). Second, it highlights the capacity of law to take a form of its own
and become a deciding factor in both production and the creation of capital, inequality and
poverty.
Finally, it engages with how the neoliberal framework has operated in the context of
Egypt since the 1970s. It highlights how the neoliberal conception of legality has been
incorporated in the Egyptian economy through a narrative employed mostly by right wing
commentators or neoclassical institutionalists. It argues that since the 1970s the economic
liberalization agenda has adopted a rhetoric of “partial reform” that is often utilized to pursue
new cycles of reform. Moreover, those new cycles end up reproducing paradoxical outcomes to
the objectives pursued.
The second chapter provides a counter narrative to the neoliberal framework by
examining how the distribution of legal(and material) entitlements has led to increased
poverty/jobless growth. It aims to accomplish that goal through three levels of analysis. The first
level revolves examining the role of the reform strategy is maintaining a cycle of poverty despite

3

improvements in growth. Building on Galal Amin’s lead, I attempt to tell my own story of the
development of the Egyptian economy. I do this with a focus on the changes in the legal
form/content and how those changes led to several negative consequences on the development
front.
The second level focuses on the hidden violent aspect of economic reform and highlights
the distributional effects associated with the “repositioning” of the state. It utilizes the concept of
the “predatory state” developed by Samir Soliman to highlight how through seemingly neutral
legal measures the state can advantage and disadvantage certain sectors.
The final level engages with the most recent publication on Egypt’s economic
development by Amr Adly. In doing so it focuses on how certain institutional arrangements
disempowered small and medium sized enterprises (SSEs and SMEs) by limiting their capacity
to access credit/resources and grow. This analysis shows the extension of distributing legal
advantages and disadvantages even within the private sphere. The inability of SSEs to gain
resources on favorable terms is similar to the situation of prisoners of debt featured in this thesis.
Both were often forced to use informal means of lending leading them to either miss out of
opportunities of growth or placing them in prison if they succeed and face difficulties. Moreover,
I focus on introducing external factors that would have influenced those institutional
arrangements. While Adly provides a powerful framework to assess access to resources, I do
disagree with his critique of leftist view on development.
The final chapter examines the situation of Egyptian debtors as an example of
paradoxical reform that has continued to damage lives since its implementation until today. This
is conducted through an examination of how the situation of debtors was exacerbated through a
counter productive understanding of law in development. The first part engages with the

4

development of the New Commercial law by examining how the law changed to empower
creditors and how that has propagated into court decisions. This empowerment effectively
disadvantaged debtors leading to an increase in their imprisonment.
The second part examines several cases reported by newspapers, NGOs and researchers.
This examination highlights the underlying causes that led debtors in the Egyptian context into
situations of debt and imprisonment. It argues that the situation occurred because of transactions
of civil nature that involved taking commodities on credit or using loans to satisfy urgent needs.
It further highlights how debt imprisonment has been facilitated by sharp declines in the
economy which are a result of previous reform programs.
`The third part features an expansion of this examination of “debtors” constructed by
IFIs, state NGOs and the Egyptian parliament; it highlights how this identity construction had
rendered the violence against the debtors’ invisible. Fourth, the chapter examines the effective
ability of the reform proposals that are based on neoclassical fantasies. It argues that the current
situation and the reform proposed; aid in placing debtors in a cycle of forced labor, imprisonment
and poverty.

5

I.

Neoliberal Legality Through “Partial Reform”

A. Law and Development and Lenses of Analysis
“Both law and economics and critical legal studies are united in their rejection of the notion
of law as public ideal. One school proclaims "law is efficient," the other that "law is
politics."7
The previous quote taken from Fiss’s “The Death of The Law?” was produced in a
critique to the emergence of law and economics and critical legal studies. Fiss was worried of the
increasing popularity of those two approaches to law in the academy and on the bench. To Fiss’s
dismay the mantra of the law and economics “law is efficient” has been later incorporated in
legal reforms strategies adopted by IFIs. This section in split into two parts: the first introduces
the theoretical legal and economic approaches examined and utilized in the thesis(Law and
Economics and CLS). The second is concerned with how legal theories(in specific the liberal
rule of law) has unfolded in practice in the Egyptian context.
The first part deals with the how theoretical legal and economic frameworks are
articulated in the context of using law as a tool of economic development.. First, it sheds the light
on the history of law and development. Second, it examines the development of law and
economics within reform strategies adopted in the context of economies of transition. Within the
neoliberal framework the role of the state is assumed to be “constrained” from market
operations. Law assumes the image of a neutral agent that allows for private interactions and
dealings. Third, it introduces the neorealist lens of analysis adopted to deconstruct ambiguities
and distributional concerns absent from law and economics. Through this lens certain fallacies

7

Owen M. Fiss The Death of the Law Cornell Law Review (1986) at 2, see also A. Bianchi, Law and Economics,
International Law Theories (2016) 263-286.
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within the first framework become apparent. Those fallacies in effect turn the neoliberal
framework on its heads. They do so because in that lens of analysis neither the state is
constrained, nor is law neutral. Both are contributing agents in wealth and poverty creation.
The second part shows how the rule of law was advanced in the Egyptian context through
a rhetoric of “partial reform”. That rhetoric aided in the maintenance of the same legal rules that
aim to privilege investors and businessmen who are assumed to generate higher growth (or
efficiency). I argue that the outcome of reconstruction of the same rationale had led to
paradoxical outcomes that contradict the objectives of reform goals.
1. Law and Development: An Overview
Interest in Law and Development became a significant part of international development
agencies after World War II. This included a “systematic and organized efforts to reform legal
systems”8; since then Law and Development has continually evolved to take different forms that
aim to shape the development process. One thing is certain, the role of Law and Development
has increased significantly during the previous decades especially in relation to MENA
countries9. The initial utilization of law in development was geared towards the purpose of
achieving development (industrialization projects for example) through state policy. However,
during the 1970s the purpose of law and development shifted to view law as a “a framework for
market activity than as an instrument of state power”10.

8

DAVID M. TRUBEK & ALVARO SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006)
at 1
9
I’m using different editions from “ A political economy of the Middle East: See MELANI CLAIRE CAMMETT ET AL.,
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Fourth edition ed. 2015 at 13, 74, 316 for example “Various
pathologies, from replacing a public monopoly with a private oligopoly to banking crises, were now explained by
“deﬁciencies in the rule of law” and similar governance issues, which is really just another way of restating the
essential necessity of market regulation. It became increasingly apparent that for the state to withdraw from the
economy, a s t ro n ger state, not a weaker one, is needed in order to regulate markets and provide the public goods
that allow them to function.” At 282
10
Trubek and Santos, supra note 8 at 1
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As argued by Trubek and Santos; during the 1990s the era of IFI sponsored reform “rule
of law” became “constitutive of development”. In the Egyptian economic development context
this conception of the “rule of law” plays a central role in Egyptian development. This
manifestation had occurred through the liberal judgments of the Supreme Constitutional Court
(SCC) that aimed to reverse previous socialist policies and affirm the right to private property.
This was further advanced in the Egyptian context with the introduction of investment law,
environmental law, banking law and the main focus of this thesis; The New Commercial Law.
It's important to emphasize that while we can trace an overall direction of the rule of law
to support market operations; different conceptualizations of the “rule of law” exist. This is not a
static concept and as noted by Santos even within the World Bank there are differing ideas as to
how it is conducted11. Trubek and Santos identify three moments that Law and Development
have been generally “reimagined”. This thesis primarily focuses on the second and third
moments or shifts in law and development. Those moments are transcribed to the Egyptian scene
through the reforms applied by the “Washington Consensus” and the “Post Washington
Consensus”. The third moment attempts to link law and development to the “social” or the
human rights field while adopting a pro market strategy that does not abandon the core of
neoliberal reforms. This has been described as adopting both a consequentialist and a formalist
approach to the market12.

11

Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds.,
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006 at 253-300
12
In reference to David Kennedy’s article in Introduction in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical
Appraisal (Alvaro Santos & David M. Trubek eds., New York: Cambridge University Press 2006).(This third
moment was in part due to the incorporation of social dimension by Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz)

8

2. The State as the Market’s Handmaiden
In the second moment of law and development the role of the state has been
“repositioned”.13 This repositioning aimed to create a “division of labor between different
institutions”14; the underlying assumption was that there could be a separation between political
and economic issues. It was also assumed that through this division of labor the state’s role
would diminish. How did that transformation occur and what were its consequences? The
transformation occurred through two measures. First, through limiting the state’s functions to
certain areas(assumption of constrain). Second, through privileging the market as the sole engine
for the generation of collective wellbeing. The consequence of that transformation is the
emergence of law that is subordinated to economic growth and efficiency.15
The retreat of the state from the public arena is envisioned to contribute to the improvement
of general wellbeing. The state has been described by the World Bank as an “overprovider”.16
This “overprovision” highlights how state action in place of the market leads to inefficiencies.
How is that articulated in practice? The state will no longer be able to direct funds at certain
industries or certain goods. This has been a recurrent theme in Egyptian history from the 1970s
onwards as highlighted in chapter II. The argument follows a utilitarian approach that
recognizes an increase in poverty and inequality resulting from the withdrawal of the state from
the provision of public services. That retreat is offset by market agents that allow for growth and
productivity on the long rum.

13

Those two sections draw on Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and Gender in
Market Reform. Vol. 3. The Hague;New York;: Kluwer Law International, (2002) at 50-52.
14
Id at 49.
15
Id at 50-56
16
Id at 52.
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However, as argued by Rittich this “retreat” is “misleading”, because what happens is that
the state is “repositioned”. This repositioning involves reconfiguring laws, policies and
institutions; thus what happens can be described as “reregulation” instead of “deregulation”.17
Moreover, analyses of the Bank’s misleading philosophy on growth and productivity in
addressed extensively in chapter II.
3. Defining The Market and the Role of Law.
Aside from efficiency considerations the state is framed as a man made creation influenced
by external pressures and politics while the market exists in the state of naturel. The market is
not a creation of man and as such there will no difficulty in establishing a division of labor
between “the enterprise and the market on one hand and institutions such as the family and the
state on the other.”18. The “overprovision” and subsequent reconfiguration of the state is set to
deprive certain groups from goods and services. However, the natural and “free” market is
supposed to provide more efficiently. The market as a free place will provide a neutral realm that
satisfies demand and supply while boosting wellbeing. The representation paints a picture of an
apolitical set of rules and laws that will empower the market. For example, investors claims take
priority over social claims, because the whole of society is set to benefit.
As the “neutral” market gains supremacy, the existence of a corresponding “neutral” legal
framework becomes necessary. This framework as analyzed by Rittich has two relevant features;
first it is concerned with the evaluation of “good” and “bad” laws. Good laws adhere to a list of
legal rules that aim to create a “free” and a “voluntary” environment for economic agents to enter
into agreements.19 Moreover, good laws are distinguished from regulation by virtue of the

17

Id at 51.
Id at 55.
19
Id at 66.
18
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priority they give to economic agents that foster economic growth. In general good laws support
state retreat from forms of administrative control and legislative action that encroaches upon the
market(Law is not political, it is efficient is the mantra). Bad laws on the other hand would
feature distributional elements and would include state intervention in the market. 20
Second, it has managed to adjust the use of the rights discourse to suit its legal framework.
This adjustment has led to the crystallization/prioritization of property rights as the priority of
that regime.21 The appropriation of the rights discourse not only allows for this theoretical
framework to gain legitimacy, but it also allows it to avoid discussions of conflict amongst
rights/claims. This also provides reformers leeway in omitting the fact that the rearrangement of
legal entitlements results in “interference with pre-existing previous institutions and practices.”22.
The consequence of those two features in economies of transition is as follow: reregulation
inspired by property rights takes away legal entitlements protecting labor and other
disadvantaged groups. The result would be an asymmetrical distribution of wealth in relation to
legal entitlements. Moreover, this result would seem “neutral” and would on the surface create a
“voluntary” environment for economic transactions. This image of freedom is only disturbed by
the contradiction within those two features. Essentially rules that are considered neutral in the
context of transition are inevitably avoiding conflicts amongst rights. This change creates winner
and losers: the winners would be capital owners who are presumed to be most capable of
creating economic growth.
4. A Post-Realist Lens of Analysis
“Law is one of the things that constitute the bargaining power of people

20

Id at 66-68.
Id.
22
Id at 69.
21
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across the whole domain of private and public life. One of the things this power
produces is a distribution of income, understood as a distribution of whatever
people value that is scarce. But another product of the deployment of power in
unequal relations is knowledge, meaning particular understandings of the world
and how it works.”23 -Duncan Kennedy
I rely on an assemblage of theories to argue that current neoliberal conceptions are
lacking, incoherent and produce contrary results. First, the framework starts with the work of
both Hohfeld and Hale to deconstruct the language of rights within the neoliberal framework.
This deconstruction highlights the active role of the state in empowering certain actors in what is
argued to be a “free” and a “voluntary” environment. Second, realists at the turn of the 20th
century provided insights into clarifying the ambiguity around the definition of property rights
and freedom of contract.24 Third, critical legal studies has benefitted from historical debates
concerning the active role of the state under the liberal rule of law to argue against the illusory
private and public boundary. In a way, it is argued that both the private market and the public are
constitutive.
Post Washington Consensus would maintain a distinction between the private and public
realms favoring the latter25. This has been a recurring theme in Egyptian reform policy; often a
rigid distinction between public and private sectors existed. As highlighted this distinction allows
for the construction of the private sector as the savior(guarantor of economic growth). The
analysis offered by Hale and Hohfled obliterates that private and public distinction; laws are

23

See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, Volume XV Legal Studies Forum (1991).
For example Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harvard Law Rev. 553 1933; Morris Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 Cornell Law Q. 8 1927
25
Dain Rodrik, Rethinking Growth Policies in the Developing World, in Luca d’Angliano Lecture in Development
Economics, Turin, Italy, October 2004.
24
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already granting power to individuals by default26. The creation of new right to sustain the
markets creates with each right(or privilege) a correlative duty, those might include “no-right”,
“liability in another”. Law effectively becomes a deciding factor of production endowing certain
properties or capital with more coercive power to extract more profit.27
This can be seen in the Egyptian case whereby the ultimate concern was to provide
investors with extensive state privileges. In the specific case of debtor prisoners covered in the
research; the state privileges investors and creditors with the ability to call upon state power to
track, arrest and imprison debtors. As can been seen from this case, the state is far detached from
the market. It is engaged in contract enforcement(the severity of which falls under contestation),
but more importantly it is engaged through its inaction through failing to protect improvised
debtors from imprisonment. Due to a rearrangement of legal entitlement previous protection was
effectively taken away.
Realists analysis into the definition of property rights has revealed that the “the classical
Blackstonian ideal of property as a complete set of powers of disposition, use and alienation” is
only one conceptualization of what property rights entails.28 Other conceptualizations might
include certain limits concerning environment or labor regulations. Parallelly, freedom of
contract has also been deconstructed to highlight that parties exercise mutual coercion based on
each party’s legal entitlements.29 Moreover, conditions of enforcement relating to the contract
might vary. With each variation the power of the contract in terms of material endowment shifts.
At this point its important to clarify that I do not use the term coercion in condemnation, but
26

Robert L. Hale Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, Political Science Quarterly 38 (3),
1923: 470-494. See, Warren Samuels, the Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases, Miami Law Review
(1973) at 348 See also Hohfeld, W.N.,Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning The
Yale Law Journal, 23(1), at 16-59 (1913)
27
For a recent account see Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital, (2019).
28
Riitch, supra note 13, at 133
29
Hale, supra note 25.
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merely as a tool to highlight that freedom or “voluntarism” is dependent on pre existing power
relations and the distribution of legal powers.It is worth highlighting that Hale believed that
coercion can only be unjustifiable or worthy of condemnation; if it was under “the sense of
influence under pain of doing a morally unjustified act.”30. At this point I’m not interested in
condemnation
State involvement in providing legal powers that maintain market operations contradicts
the assumption of state retreat. Moreover, it also highlights the limits of using terms such as
private and public or state and market as two separate realms. It also uncovers the distributional
element in what argued to be a neutral legal framework. If anything if we consider the state as a
private actor empowering other private actor any boundary between state and the market
collapses. In essence, private power could be viewed as a delegation of sovereignty.
B. The Rule of Law and Rhetoric of Partial Reform
While I had started this thesis with an overall puzzlement from the status of the Egyptian
economy, there has been a constant voice over the years claiming that the failure is not puzzling,
but a product of “partial reform”. This voice has been present since the 1970s; it was often
associated with those calling for more economic liberalization. As professor Galal Amin had
highlighted since 1977 the pace of economic liberalization and foreign aid has been “almost
never interrupted”.31 Through the “partial reform” argument; legal reforms were enacted with
the purpose of “repositioning” the state and privileging certain economic actors.
At the heart of the “partial reform” argument is the absolute faith in a rigid distinction
between a public sector and a private sector. This faith is further projected into the ability of the
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latter to function better in order to improve overall well-being. In order to act on this faith, the
Egyptian agenda since the mid 1970s has been geared towards preferential treatment to both
foreign investors and businessmen. The specific movements and shifts in the Egyptian political
economy are examined in some detail in chapter two.
I argue that from the 1970s till today, there has been a continuous reconstruction of a
“partial reform” justification. This reconstruction has been used as a justification for the failure
of reform. Moreover, “partial reform” in times can be envisioned as a reform approach on its
own (i.e. Conducted on purpose). To clarify, I’m not implying that reformers had always
maintained that the reform programs were perfect, providing a label for the reform at the time of
implementation is not the object of this chapter. Rather this part is concerned with the
maintenance of the same policy choices under either “partial reform” rhetoric for reform or
“partial reform” in justifying constant failures. Moreover, the argument that this part will
establish using several critiques of the liberal “reform” agenda is that; Egypt had undergone
“paradoxical reform” that consistently defies the objectives established by reform programs. This
is not a product of a failure of state and/or society, but a failure in policy choices, specifically in
the tools available for liberal legal economists attempting to provide solutions for the Egyptian
system.
This section traces the “partial reform” argument from the 1970s till 2017. It examines
the narratives of state officials and academics with an attempt to highlight the imagined missing
ingredient from Egypt’s development formula. Each reform strategy and a “partial reform”
justification were products of their periods; the aim from periodizing Egyptian legal economic
history is to avoid totalizing the conceptualizations of “reform “ or “partial reform”.
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1. Partial Reform and Infitah 1974-1977
The 1970s featured the rise of liberal economic “reform”; legal rules were the first
indicator that the Egyptian economy is attempting to incentivize and depend on private investors.
The 1971 constitution included article 34 and 36; both attempted to establish certain privileges
over property rights; those privileges included a prohibition on state action to nationalize or
sequester assets. If assets were sequestered, then the constitution guarantees fair compensation.
Along with the constitutional changes, Law 65 enacted in 1971 aimed to attract investors and
shift away from Nasserist policies towards a market driven economy. The law was later
abrogated through law 43 of 1974 which was later also amended through Law 32 of 1977.
Each of those changes in legal rules carries with it an understanding of “reform” and a
justification for the failure through the idea of “partial reform”. The first period that had included
Law 65 aimed to “establish a system of incentives, guarantees, and privileges for foreign
investors in Egypt ''32. However, the economic outcomes of the law can not be assessed during
that period due to the state of war and uncertainty the country had witnessed. The law was geared
towards establishing export oriented industries and free zones; however, in 1974 it was decided
that this law was not enough, thus it was replaced by Law 43 of 1974.33
The second period aimed to “provide incentives and guarantees beyond those previously
afforded foreign investors”.34 However, the law was also heavily critiqued by foreign investors;
one of the main conflicts between the state and the private sector at the time was the latter's
insistence on depending on short term projects that yield 25-40% return.35 One the other hand,
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the Egyptian government at that time had aimed to attract investors that would contribute to the
gross capital formation; not those who would leave after a 5 year short term investment. Another
major area of dispute was the investors’ insistence on accessing the “untapped” Egyptian market;
while avoiding contributing to export oriented industries.36
The second period was during the premiership of Abd El Aziz Higazi and the third
extends from 1975 till the next period of reform(ERSAP). Higazi was adamant in this
distinction; according to him; his idea of reform depended on a partial “Open Door” that aimed
to attract Arab and foreign investors' money.37 He had highlighted that during 1974-1975; he was
able to attract a significant amount of investment from Gulf States.38 In a way; he envisioned
further public action along the lines of Keynesian economics with gradual opening of the
economy. Higazi aimed to distance himself from what was later popularly labeled as “Infitah
Sadah Madah” (Chaos of Infitah).39 This line of thought is in fact compatible with the previous
contentions with foreign investors’; as the private sector was largely interested in non productive
sectors for the consumption of the Egyptian public.
2. Partial Reform and the 1977 Amendments
The amendment of Law 43 in 1977; aimed to address certain “partial reform”
justifications during that period. Specifically, the proponents of liberal reform contended that the
exchange rate for investors needs to be adjusted in order to allow for repatriation of funds.40
What was more dangerous was the expansion of investor activities beyond the export oriented
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projects.41 Specifically, investors were allowed to partake in capital intensive projects for local
consumption, this included access to the chemicals industry and cement.42 This can be contrasted
with two accounts from that period. The first was the contention between investors and the
government on investment activities. The second was a contrast between the choice of the public
sector under Aziz Sedky to choose particular projects that were labor intensive and would
function as import substitutes.43
Furthermore, the law included a significant clause that extended investors' privileges in
the construction sector; it had even given them permission to expand beyond the borders of the
cities.44 The expansion of Law 43 in 1976-1977 included the implementation of four legal
articles setting a general criteria to allow privileges to investors over a wide range of projects.45
Higazi would most likely be critical of that law; especially that he aimed to distance himself
from the rise of consumerism symbolized conspicuous consumption that was founded on
expanding the privileges of investors.46
Higazi’s reform seemed to aim for a door half open situation; however, in order to attract
foreign funding; the legal rules of the Egyptian system had undergone a chain reaction that
included an expansion in legal rules that support a liberal economy. Once legal rules were
introduced in 1971, 1974 and 1977 the economy had undergone effectively a forced “Open
Door” policy. Laws providing privileges and protection to the private sphere were essential if
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Egypt were to depend on foreign finance and the private sector. The question now becomes; did
this reform program embodied in the shift of legal rules yield its desired outcomes?
3. Outcomes of Reform and the Resurgence of Partial Reform
Towards the beginning of 1980s; the results of economic liberalization, dependency on
investors and the private sector “dismayed even many of its most fervent adherents”.47 The
failure of economic liberalization and dependency on investors was manifested in the failure of
the economy to attract investors and capital transfers. According to prime minister Higazi; the
capital transfers increased from 1974 to 1990 by 65%.48 However, a decomposition of those
transfers highlights that around 75% of capital was from Egyptians who invested money abroad
and had relocated funds to Egypt. Higazi’s estimates placed gross fixed investment from
economic liberalization at 10% from the implementation of policies till the death of Sadat. To
put this in context, the situation in South Korea in that similar period featured around 460%
growth of gross fixed investment during 1974-1985.49
The partial reform argument was readily utilized during that period to highlight that the
failure of the regime had occurred because investors did not acquire enough legal privileges that
would make the Egyptian market attractive. This narrative was also echoed in the writings of
liberal development scholars at the time; Bush and Bromley during the 1990s noted that the same
scholars argued that the periods of reform within Infitah were also “partial reform in the
following passage;”This consensus argues that after 1967, and especially since 1973, the Nasserist model proved to be increasingly
unworkable, and that the hesitant steps taken under the infitah have been too limited to produce meaningful reform”.50
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was followed by a variety of liberal legal decisions issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court
in the 1980s; those decisions attempted to strip away the last vestiges of decision making when it
came to economic development policies.51
The Egyptian development policy approach constructed an image of a “savior” that does
not only have the capacity to adjust macroeconomic indicators, but also provide a sustainable
and inclusive growth. This savior was the private sector, FDI and investors. The central question
became; how to summon the figure of the savior? At a moment of desperation during the period
1986-1990s the IFIs granted the Egyptian regime an extended answer that should solve the
predicament associated with that question. This answer was in the form of a series of laws that
aimed at creating a legal framework that is conducive to FDI and the private sector. The answer
also included insistence on the transfer of state owned enterprises(SOEs) to the private sphere.
4. The IFI’s Sponsored Reform and the Reconstitution of Partial
Reform
“Negotiating tactics included “numbers games,” “smokescreens,” and “musical ministers.” Calculations of inflation rates, the GDP, and
government revenues and spending can be distorted, concealed, and simply falsified. . . . The government created interministerial committees
with overlapping jurisdictions to confuse outsiders – no one knew who was really in charge (if, indeed, anyone was)”52 - Alan Richard’s comment
on Egypt’s hesitation to adopt IFI policies before 1991.

The previous quote represented the viewpoint of IFIs’; this point adhered to the idea of a
“savior” figure that can be conjured out of thin air. On the other side of the negotiating table
some of the Egyptian ministers did not understand the obsession awarded to the private sector.53
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There was nearly consensus in the EBHRC session from the business community, ministers and
academics that there was no basis for the ERSAP strategy. According to Industry minister
Mohamed Abdel Wahab; they did not know why they were privatizing, it was closer to faith; in
fact, he had described the reform program in theological terms as a “call to prayer”. Furthermore,
according to investment pioneer Hany Tawfik who was responsible for the appraisal of
companies to be privatized during that period; what had happened during ERSAP was
“criminal”; it had “sold Egypt’s air” and had “robbed future generations of their future”.54 This
particular testimony is significant coming from a leading figure in Egypt’s private sector.
According to Khalid Ikram “serious structural reform did not begin until the 1990s”55;
however Ikram, refrains from providing a definitive evaluation on the outcome of ERSAP
policies. This lack of evaluation occurs despite his adoption of the view that the principle
element in ERSAP was about giving the private sector a leading role in the economy. I argue that
there were shared similarities between ERSAP and Infitah. Those shared similarities indicate a
failure in policy, not a failure due to circumstances. Firstly, the policies were unable to conjure
up the imagery of the savior. This had occurred despite the introduction of several bodies of law
that aim to privilege investors, it had included economic measures such as tax holidays as well as
the establishment of a financial market. Moreover, that period had included the adoption of new
investment law, new commercial law, environmental law, capital markets law and Law 203
addressing the privatization of SOEs.
The second similarity between both reform programs lies in the justification offered for
both “reform” programs; the reform was also labeled as “partial reform” and that is why it did
not achieve its main objective. It is quite puzzling that Prof. Ikram in the latest version of his
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book refused to render a conclusion about ERSAP especially when the strategy and tools adopted
had failed to award the private sector a leading role. It is worth noting that some proponents of
economic liberalization maintained that the reform was always going to be “partial”; this was the
case with Fouad Soultan (He thought for example a full reform would include a change in 30
articles of the constitution.). However, it is worth noting that Soultan sought the “partial
economic reform” conducted in the early 2000s was a positive step; the outcomes of the high
GDP in the early 2000s culminated in a revolution demanding economic equality.56 Nonetheless,
the question still remains whether the outcomes of carrying out partial reform are desirable?
Finally, it would seem that in both periods the Egyptian state as well as IFIs ignored
lessons learned from the British experience. Following a universalized and a generalized model
that ignored the British experience led to a significant loss to the public. During infitah it had
occurred with the rise of conspicuous consumption; despite the constant warnings of prime
minister Higazi to Sadat. Higazi had briefed Sadat on the British experience in “nursing back the
economy into normalcy”.57 During the ERSAP; Owen raised the same issue in highlighting that
the appraisal of SOEs was going to be at a loss to the state during the underdevelopment of the
financial sector.58 Both incidents had ignored historical precedents and lessons to support an
ideological commitment to a disastrous recipe; whether removal of import tariffs or blind
privatizations.
5. Partial Reform at the turn of the century
“The paper concludes by stating that privatization of banks is not a panacea in itself and to attain the benefits of privatization it has to
be accompanied by stable macroeconomic conditions and a healthy regulatory and competitive environment. “ Paper authored by Mahmoud
MoheiElDin and Sahar Nasr; both become investment/finance ministers from 2004-2010 and 2015-2019 respectively
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One of the conditions laid out by scholars to “fix” or “complete” the “reform” beyond tax
breaks, and legal privileges was the materialization of a competitive environment. This
understanding of reform that moves along with privatization was adopted in 2003 in a paper coauthored by two of Egypt’s investment ministers. This was not just an internal endeavor,
emphasis on competition law was placed as condition for Egypt to engage in a trade agreement
with the EU. In 2005, the parliament approved a competition law to complement the partiality of
“reform”. Competition law was another ingredient that fell within the “partial reform” argument.
MoheiElDin, one of the authors’ of this quote, was shortly after Egypt’s investment minister in
2004. In 2019; he had claimed in a public lecture in AUC that “partial reform” was the cause of
the underdevelopment of Egypt in each development strategy adopted.
Fortunately, parts of the “partial reform” legal “solutions” were examined over the years;
the adoption of competition law fits into another series of “paradoxical reforms”. Dina Waked in
analyzing the Steel and Cement interactions with competition law noted two findings.59 Firstly,
competition law has been delayed in adoption in Egypt due to concern for investors and local
businessmen.60 Secondly, the main beneficiaries from privatization or previous laws were able to
start a chain of legislation that negatively impacts social peace.61 This was done through limiting
the liability within the competition law to include fixed fines and not percentages of profit. The
only conviction the law accomplished was against the cement cartel; one of the most pollutive
industries.62 The cartel has managed to inflict a considerable amount of “social benefit” leakage.
Each company within the industry and it is mostly composed of foreign entities paid around ten
59
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million EGP out of hundreds of millions in profit. As a result of previous legal rules; the new
laws were shaped in a way that supports leakages in public finance.
6. Partial Reform as The Rule of Law.
“Although these problems arguably had been building for some time, they became acute when oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s.
The decline of rents was widely noted at the time, and many analysts (including the authors of this book) thought that such a development
provided an opportunity for real institutional change. As a simple generalization, one can say that many MENA governments have markedly
improved their macroeconomic management but have postponed or simply balked at more complex reforms, such as privatization, regulatory
reform, and development of the rule of law.”63 -John Waterbury, Alan Richards, Ishaac Diwan and Melani Camett.

The previous quote represents some of the recently suggested classical solutions that are
used to complete the “partial reform” argument. It is nothing but another attempt to summon an
imaginary savior. The same rhetoric was advanced “not enough privileges were granted to
investors” to justify the failure of ERSAP; the concept of “partial reform” survived. Recently as
the quote above highlights; it has become privatization, regulation and the rule of law as further
necessary ingredients. There has been too much literature on privatization; this research aims to
demystify and assess the impact of regulatory reform and the development of “rule of law” on
development. This is particularly important in light of the construction of both as tools that can
be used to “complete” the reform agenda. Both have been framed as solutions that will evidently
manage to summon the savior. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, this construction
over the years has created recurring problems that continually evokes the need for a vague and a
counter productive idea of the “rule of law”.
The newest edition of the classical book “Political Economy of the Middle East”64;
reference to the “rule of law” as a tool for development has increased significantly in comparison
to previous editions(Compared to one mention in a single page in the previous edition, the new
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edition dedicates pages, graphs, analysis of rule of law in MENA)65. Every time the rule of law is
mentioned it is related to local corruption. It is often a “petty government official” and a lack of
enforcement were the reasons for bad governance and underdevelopment.
The rule of law has in recent years been framed as a constitutive part of development; in
MENA it has become the solution to the “partial reform” dilemma. However, the idea of “rule of
law” is not only related to controlling corruption. The rule of law as the next chapters will argue
has been present during the earlier reform periods. Law has always been in the background.

65

Cammett, supra note 9.

25

II.

Cycles of Poverty Through “Partial Reform”

A. The History and Consequences of “Partial Reform”
In December 1983, the Oriental Hall in the American University in Cairo hosted a large
crowd that included; Egyptian ministers, scholars from different disciplines, development and
donor agencies. The symposium was titled “The Impact of Development Assistance on Egypt”; it
aimed to answer a variety of questions, four of them are of relevance to this chapter. The
questions were as follows; is the country better off than it was? is the country able to set and
achieve its objectives? How are various groups which combine to make Egyptian society faring
off these days? And what has been the impact on Egypt of the large development assistance
programs which have operated in that country in recent years?.66
Thirty-seven years later; those questions are still relevant and they are at the heart
of this thesis. The main points that the symposium covered included; i) conflict between donor
and government in setting priorities, ii) dependency, iii) the nature of aid relationship, iv) explicit
or tacit strings or conditions associated with aid.67 This thesis also touches upon those four
points, however, in retrospect, it aims to offer a different story to the “partial reform” rhetoric
through examining both the process and the consequences of partial reform and the pursuit of
the savior figure. I argue that because of political externalities imposing certain development
strategies; the economy became volatile to several instabilities that have plunged the economy
into a cycle of poverty and loans. In specific Egypt’s economy shifted from productive sectors to
non-productive sectors leading to a weakness in current accounts and a volatility towards
external pressures. This was associated with the use of both aid and loans controlled by IFIs, US
treasury or US AID.
66
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1. The Return of Relations and Foreign Intervention (1974-1987).
“Economists are not the most modest of people, although they have a lot to be modest about. They are every ready to pronounce
judgement on the economic experiences of different countries, find it easy to pronounce one a success an another a failure, and to all
some of them miracles. They seem to be confident that they know the main causes of success and failure. This is surprising for it does
not appear that their toolbox contains what enables them to pass judgements with much confidence”68 -Galal Amin commenting on the
“Success” of the Egyptian economy post ERSAP

This quote is from a brilliant short analysis of ERSAP conducted by Galal Amin.
According to Amin; each economist attempts to tell a story based on a select variables while
neglecting others that may lead to a different conclusion. In the next few paragraphs I will
attempt to tell my own story of Egypt’s economic performance similar to what Amin had done
twenty-three years ago in assessing ERSAP. That story does not include the mainstream accounts
focusing on GDP growth and inflation. Rather it starts with the assumption that those changes
are short term improvements that have not historically yielded improvements in the economy.
Moreover, the story of that performance can not be separated from the mechanisms that placed
the Egyptian economy in a constant cycle of loans and spiraling poverty. Firstly, Egypt’s rule
during each of those periods will be examined to highlight certain political determinants with
regards to the decision making within the state. Second, each section will highlight some of the
conditionalities associated with either loans or aid. It will attempt to highlight the role of those
conditionalities in shaping Egypt’s economy and productive sectors.
Egypt’s rule at the time should be understood in the authoritarian context of one man
rule.69 There is an academic consensus that Sadat did not only listen to elites nor advisors in only
foreign policy, but also in economic policies.70 Some of Infitah’s disasters were communicated
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to Sadat through his prime minister Higazi at the time, but to quote Ikram; “He (Sadat) was
basking in the adulation of his close circle and of Western commentators, and was in no mood to
do anything that might mute their applause”71. Sadat’s one-man rule was supported by the
“peace” dividend; it is not hard to imagine in Egypt’s case the role of political externalities
manifested in the power of western states on Sadat in effecting the conditions of loans and aid.
Moreover, his close circle here denotes a small number of figures who had a role in shaping
Egypt’s political economy along with IFIs and development agencies.72 The following sections
will attempt to highlight the role of IFIs and aid in exposing the Egyptian economy to volatility
through reinforcing conspicuous consumption and non productive sectors. The construction of
the private sector and FDI as the savior were at the heart of IFI policies.
Adel Hussien’s seminal book “From Independence to dependency”73 at the time records
the move from independence to dependency through a variety of conditions aimed at strategic
sectors of the economy such as cement and pesticides.74 His book unpacks the vulnerability of
Egypt’s dictator to external coercion through economic conditionalities. Moreover, Egypt’s
dictator had the capacity to transmit this coercion by outside entities through repression and
authoritarian rule within the national context. Hussien records how at certain instances the
parliament would sign on a blank paper not knowing the interest rate nor the conditions attached
to loans.75
In fact, Ikram's conversation with the US Ambassador supports a strong relationship
between Sadat and the US administration that had excluded Egyptians from the decision making
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process.76 For example after the 1977 bread riots; the ambassador had highlighted that as long as
the Sadat committed to his “moderation” with regards to the “peace deal” then the loans would
continue.77 It is no wonder that Sadat did not only ignore his advisory team in Camp David, but
had returned home with a massive campaign of repression directed at Egyptians.78
The IFIs were able to manage the recycling of petrodollars as development loans to
developing countries such as Egypt.79 Although Egyptian loans between 1975-1977 originated
mainly from Gulf states; their conditions and management were left to the IFIs. Hussien
highlights how the laws attached to the loans taken included foreign interference in the economy.
This interference included a prohibition on the state’s ability to foster special strategic
industries.80 Moreover, it had extended to manipulate the pricing in certain industries such as
cement, it had set priorities to which factories or projects would receive energy intake.81 This had
also included a prohibition on setting preferential access to certain strategic industries. In short
the IFIs through loans in the 1970s were able to limit the role of the state in pursuing
development goals.82
The 1970s also featured a rise in US aid; this was often labeled in literature as tied aid.
There are three aspects concerning the situation of aid that situates it as a tool that attempts to
shift production in the economy. The first two aspects are commonly utilized, the third aspect

76

Ikram supra note 46, at 56-58
id.
78
Brownlee supra note 69
79
Hussien supra note 73 at 164-169
80
id. at 224 and 214-218
81
id.
82
id, but also supported by several minister narratives from that period EBHRC panel on industrialization (2006)
and on Aziz Sedky(2008). In fact, Dani Rodrik in 1999 had argued that “contrary to received wisdom, ISI-driven
growth did not produce tremendous inefficiencies on an economywide scale. In fact, the productivity performance of
many Latin American and Middle Eastern countries was, in comparative perspective, exemplary.” See Dani Rodrik,
The new global economy and developing countries: Making openness work. Overseas Development Council, Policy
Essay no. 24. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, (1999)
77

29

was highlighted by Beshai in 1983. Firstly, US aid awarded to Egypt was accompanied by the
condition that part of aid is used to purchase raw materials and products from the US at higher
prices83. Hussien notes that this was not the same situation when development loans and aid were
awarded in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact around 400 U.S companies benefited from the 8.7
billion USD of aid from 1975 till 1983.84 Secondly, a common critique to aid is that it attempts to
maintain American competitiveness by flooding or suppressing domestic markets. In fact this
was highlighted by US AID officials; whereby they highlighted how aid was responsible for the
reduction Egyptian wheat production. Wheat currently is the highest item imported by the
Egyptian state.85
Thirdly, as Beshai notes, the US aid to Egypt shockingly neglected the agriculture sector.
As he argues the sector embodied Egyptian comparative advantage and due to its nature as labor
intensive it was at the time the largest employer of labor.86 Out of 8.2 billion dollars of aid only
343 million were designated to the agriculture sector. Prof. Beshai did not see value in expanding
outside of the cities and leaving the rural areas; at this point it is worth emphasizing not just the
role of aid in construction and urban expansion.87 We should also be emphasizing the role of
legal changes in 1977 awarding investors the privilege to invest in urbanization outside of the
urban cities.88
Beshai was also suspicious about the over emphasis on new technological adaptations in
the agriculture sector.89 He was in favor of more land reclamation projects and rehabilitation of
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rural centers where poverty existed. Mitchell later on in 2003 would highlight the failure of the
technological aid and would stress how it had disrupted the efficient ways farmers were able to
utilize the land in.90
Mitchell also confirms that stagnation of cotton production as well as the decrease in
acreage from 6 million acres to one million.91 It is worth noting that cotton was the backbone of
Egyptian exports for decades. In 1914; it constituted 90% of Egyptian exports, in 1966 it
constituted 66% and in 2017 it had reached 1.5%.92 The sector was replaced by crude oil; one of
Egypt’s rentier sectors that are highlighted affected by external volatility similar to the same
volatility that occurred in 1987.
A large share of US development low interest loans were directed at import businesses.93
Egypt’s comparative advantage in labor intensive sectors such as agriculture was hindered as
agriculture had “lost out on medium and long term investment”.94 Until 1974; Egypt had a “net
favorable trade balance for agriculture”95This had changed by 1981 with the food imports
exceeding the exports by three billion USD.96
This shift has also been accompanied by a rhetoric that attempts to disadvantage small
agricultural producers in favor of larger ones. This narrative was carried forth by both academics
and senior officials in Sadat’s government.97 It should not come as a surprise that the
construction and agriculture elite had prospered in the time of Sadat considering two of the great
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beneficiaries from the two sectors were amongst his closest advisors; Sayid Marie and Osman
Ahmed Osman.98
In short, during the 1970s the IFIs contributed in laying the foundations of the Egyptian
economy; this foundation paved the way for a shift in production from export oriented industries
into an increase in imports, it had suppressed the agriculture sector in the economy by diverting
funds to other non productive sectors such as construction. But more importantly it had
established privileges to the savior figure without any regard to where the growth of the
economy was occurring. This perhaps was the early beginning of the “rule of law” protecting
Egyptian underdevelopment.
2. The Consequences of Partial Reform
The open door policy had several impacts on both the Egyptian economy and society.
Firstly, during that period the term “jobless growth” would be first used in the Egyptian
context.99 It has been used again recently in 2020 to describe the recent neoliberal reforms
undertaken by Egypt.100 Second, Infitah signaled the first warning sign about the consequences
of social instability on the Egyptian economy.
Firstly, the phenomenon of “jobless growth” included a shift in Egyptian society
indicative of a shift in political economy. Kandil had highlighted that in 1970 Egyptian had no
millionaires; by 1980; there were 17,000. Around 40% of those millionaires had acquired wealth
simply through land speculation.101 Construction rose by 107% during that period; over 90% of
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this construction was aimed at luxury homes and villas. Kandil reports that between 1974-1979
the percentage of national investment that went into construction was 43%; while 60% of both
aid and loans were devoted to the similar objective.102
This period had also included some of the highest GDP growth rates in Egyptian history.
This is a similarity that this period has with years prior to the 2011 revolution; in fact, during the
high GDP growth rates, a large scale social eruption took place also in January 1977. Aside from
a lack of employment and a shift in the political economy structure; there was a rising trend of
inequality. For example, the lowest 20% of income earners had acquired around 6.6% of national
income in 1960; this has increased by 6% in 1970 to reach 7% of national income. By the late
1970s; the lowest earners share of income was around 5.1% of national income. This is to be
contrasted with the top 5% of earners acquiring 17.4% of national income in 1960; that had
increased by 26% in late 1970s to acquire 22% of national income.103
This rise in inequality is a product of privileging certain segments of society over others.
Legal rules were distributed asymmetrically to increase the productivity of certain sectors. The
same conditions in loans and aid channeled the capital through legal conduits into import
industries and capital intensive industries. Both contribute directly to inequality, and both gained
their competitive edge and productivity from legal rules within international agreements.
The rise in GDP growth in Egypt was halted by two realities; the first was the ghost of
the bread riots in 1977. The second was the collapse of oil prices in 1987. Both situations
highlight the role of instability during that period. This instability is split into two parts. The first
is social instability due to inequality, inflation and worsening standards of living (for example
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“jobless growth”). The second instability occurred precisely because Egypt had depended on
“windfall” funds and had repressed productive exportable sectors at home. The decline in oil
prices, led to a decline in worker remittances and had pushed Egypt towards two deals with
creditors. The first was the Paris deal in 1987 and the second was ERSAP in 1991.
3. A State in Crisis; A Self Perpetuating Cycle of Poverty 1987-2003
In May 1991, Egypt engaged in two separate reform programs; at that time the IMF and
World Bank had devised two programs attached to two loans to aid Egypt during its economic
crisis. In return for adopting reform programs and participating in the war the Paris Club decided
to “forgive” 50% of Egyptian debt. Around 19.6 billion USD were relinquished over
installments. The omission of half of the debt effectively freed 2% of Egypt’s GDP just to
service the debt104.
Prior to the Paris Club cancelling Egypt’s debt; the economy was in shambles; this was
due to external volatility because of dependency on non-productive sectors and oil. When the oil
prices witnessed a phenomenal decrease 1980s Egypt featured high deficits in both the budget
and external accounts. To quote prof. Beshai; “a currency is mirrored in the productive sectors in
the economy”(quote from lecture; how do I reference that? Or can I?). Earlier shifts to
construction and weak approaches to agriculture have rendered the economy vulnerable.
To provide an image of the Egyptian economy before the “reforms”, inflation was at
20%, while external debt constituted 28% of GDP105. The IMF was engaged in adjusting the
major indicators through conditioned loans; the first of which was 300 million USD in 1991. The
World Bank was responsible for structural adjustments which included; “fighting poverty and
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enhancing level standards through structural reforms” to this end another loan of 300 million
USD started the process106. The reform programs were part of the Washington consensus at the
time; the overall theme was growth through pro market strategies and free trade. The consensus
placed the following conditions; fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, privatization and securing
property rights through the implementation of laws and institutions107.
In Egypt’s case the World Bank devised programs for reform and conducted several
meetings and surveys with businessmen and investors. To quote Dr. Khalid Ikram “The chief of
these(complaints of businessmen) concerned the glacial working of the commercial judicial
system”. Law was at the heart of the reforms in the Egyptian context; the investment law,
environmental law and the new commercial law were all adopted during the 1990s108. For
example, the Environmental law of Egypt is complete sync with the World Bank’s pro market
environmental assessment handbook. 109
4. Outcomes of Reform; A Renewal of Subjugation.
In 2009, EBHRC hosted a round table that included several academics, ministers and
businessmen who gathered to evaluate certain aspects of the ERSAP. Towards the end of the
session, Prof. Soliman commented addressing the ministers with a quote taken from Ihasn Abdel
Qudus had written during the time of Nasser that a secret organization rules Egypt behind closed
doors. The reason for Soliman quoting AbdulQudus was that; most of the ministers present at the
meeting were not in favor of the ERSAP policies. If anything, they sought the core of ERSAP
which was privatization and was conducted with no vision. The earlier account of minister
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Mohamed Abdel Wahab highlights how the core of ERSAP was a theological “call to prayer”
based on faith. The government was instructed to follow ERSAP despite having extreme
reservations110. It is unbelievable to paint Egypt’s team as “able to hold its own in the
negotiations” when that team was detached from the realities experienced by the ministers.111
A major difference between IFIs and Egyptian officials centered around three issues. The
IFIs constant reply to the issues was that a conception of the “private” sector is more “efficient”,
the IFIs had complete faith in the ability of the market. The Egyptian officials had three lines of
responses; firstly, the public sector can perform as efficiently as the private sector. Second, the
public sector needed funding due years of restrictions on funds, ministers were often puzzled that
the government reaction has always been reductions in budgets, but not expansion along the line
of Keynesian understanding. Third, the ministers did not object to the impositions and
conditionalities of IFIs out of ideological grounds, but they thought pragmatically that allowing
the private sector to prosper lay in allowing it the possibility to grow to support Egypt’s market.
They disagreed on a transfer of ownership that would lead to a destructive private sector that
would effectively kill the last of Aziz Sedky’s accomplishments with regards to productive
sectors in the economy.112
Ikram responds to the first line by claiming the profitability of public enterprises was
considered “humpty dumpty” because they receive privileges from the state113. Ikram does not
issue a totalizing judgment. However, he believes that the success of the public sectors in certain
aspects is a rare occasion. In a legal realist understanding this distinction is not necessarily
accurate; for example, cronyism associated with the privatized companies included legal rules
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increasing the productivity of firms away from public benefit. Public benefit here would depend
on the difference in each of the sets of privileges the state awards to both the private and the
public sector alike. If anything, I argue that public companies have managed to be profitable
when they remained away from direct political control. An argument made by Heikal when he
assessed the successful performance of Mahmoud Yunes in administering the Suez Canal114.
Minister El Kafarway made the same argument with regards to the public companies in the era of
Aziz Sedky. According to El Kafarway; during the patriotic leadership of Sedky the companies
were successful and profitable.115 Kafarawy’s account on the success of industrialization
through state led policies had support in the literature of Egypt’s economic history.116
Egypt received praise from IFIs over the adoption of trade agreements with the EU. The
specific advantage from IFIs point of view was Egypt’s cheap labor that made the country
attractive for certain types of investment. Those types of investments were often related to
pollutive industries; FDI poured in Egypt’s cement industry in an attempt to use it for export and
provide cheaper cement for the increasing non productive sectors such as construction. Aside
from FDI supporting non productive sectors; the Egyptian communities suffered from increased
pollution levels. The cheap labor in Egypt’s case was translated into cheap lives that are unable
to pay for a clean environment.
The ERSAP was able to control and even improve certain macroeconomic indicators;
most significant was the reduction of debt, increased GDP growth as well as inflation reduction.
However, according to studies examining the purchasing capacity of households to purchase
basic nutrients; it would seem that Egyptian poverty during that period increased from 21% to
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44%.117 Similar to Infitah the country did not witness growth of exports, nor were there an
improvement in trade balance. Furthermore, FDI during the period of “reforms” had in fact
declined.
The “reform” in the 1990s was short lived, according to different scholars, the
improvement occurred because of sale of SOEs, freezes on wages and hiring as well as a rise in
tourism.118 The last account seems plausible as the economic performance declined after the
1997 terrorist attacks in Luxor. This was further exacerbated as the Asian crisis also affected the
economy on two fronts, depreciation in Asian currency improved their terms of trade. Moreover,
international economic stagnation further limited the ability of the FDI part of the constructed
savior to materialize. By 2003 the economy was witnessing a slow down that necessitated
another round of reforms and privatization. The dependency on windfall funds, as well as
construction (i.e non productive capital intensive sector) has hindered the ability of the economy.
To summarize; a chain of political externalities in the late 1970s shifted production and
exacerbated inequality. This led to a weakened bargaining position due to vulnerability to debt.
Moreover, it resulted in an expansion of political externalities leading to the adoption of several
laws in the 1990s; those laws adhered to the principles that privileged Egypt’s savior. While
those laws improved macroeconomic indicators the economy remained vulnerable due to a shift
in non-productive sectors. In short, Egypt’s reform projects since the 1970s have led to changes
that are inherently contradictory to the objectives of the reform projects. Those laws further
exacerbated inequality and led to further deterioration of social peace.
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5. Law Versus Regulation; The Rise of Cronyism in Egypt
In 1999; Timothy Mitchell authored a seminal article that critically examined the
performance of ERSAP. The following statement is of extreme importance to the research;
“It(Egypt) now subsidized financiers instead of factories, cement kilns instead of bakeries,
speculators instead of schools.”119. Mitchell’s analysis of the status of the Egyptian economy was
reinforced by recent research tackling cronyism and politically connected firms in Egypt.
Mitchell had already reported in 1999 that politically connected investors (foreign and Egyptian)
were benefiting from tariff measures.120 Cronyism has been largely present in either rentier,
capital intensive and pollutive sectors.121 This section poses two arguments with regards to both
the construction of “corruption” as a hindrance to development and the idea of the private sector
as a “savior” of the economy. Firstly, both the “rule of law” and regulation in Egypt worked
hand in hand to privilege the private sector; in that sense, both are not different. This argument is
established in order to establish a dent on the necessary condition within liberal conceptions of
“rule of law” to protect and expand property rights. Second, the use of “social peace” over the
emphasis on investor and creditor privileges(savior image) can stimulate the economy in the
Egyptian context.122
The recent work on cronies makes two serious errors in locating the source of the
empowerment of cronies. Firstly, The authors’ link its development to the financial and legal
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liberalization related to the rise of Gamal Mubarak in the late 1990s.123 I argue they had made the
same mistake of the Egyptian ministers’ thinking that reform did not have any basis or was
carried internally. Gamal Mubarak’s role has been facilitated by the moments in Law and
Development. The only way to which the cronies were able to utilize the legal system in order to
gain privileges occurred primarily due to impositions from the IFIs on the Egyptian government.
Secondly, it would seem that they adhere to a fictitious and fallacious distinction between
rule of law and regulation.124 Egyptian cronies such as ones reported by Diwan et al, might
benefit from regulation, but they have been empowered by the “rule of law”, they have been
empowered by IFI’ policies such as privatization. It is because of that empowerment that legal
regulations exist in their current form. As Rittich had argued those reforms did not consider
previous arrangements of power distribution or institutional guarantees that provide and protect
for certain groups.125 Consequently, regulation enacted as the rule of law empowered existing
business actors while stripping away entitlements from public entities and communities. In this
sense reregulation established existing rights in favor of the dominant actors. It was Ahmed Ezz
that had acquired SOEs that monopolized steel and it was foreign companies that had acquired
the publicly owned companies forming the cement cartel.126
Both the steel and cement industries stand as examples of the ability of beneficiaries from
the “rule of law” projects and reform to influence new conceptions of “rule of law”. Ultimately,
they can also influence regulation, therefore, the distinction between law and regulation fades, if
anything, the liberal rule of law in the 1990s constituted the irregularities associated with
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cronyism. It had also coalesced those irregularities with protections such property rights(as
broadly conceived as possible) that might prevent future corrections.127
Advancement of the “rule of law” and good governance will not solve the cumulative
effects of cronies plaguing the Egyptian economy. Only a re-imagination of the “rule of law” can
yield such a result. This imagination has to go beyond arbitrary efficiency calculations into
considering the distributional element within the law, The previous analysis in chapter one
indicates that “rule of law” in Egypt developed as a set of privileges to the private sector.
While Egypt had witnessed decades of increased privileges towards the use of property; during
the same time cronies rose to power. This rise to power led to a specialization in sectors that are
both capital intensive, rentier and pollutive. The rise of cronies is indicative of the role of
political determinants in shaping legislation and regulation (Keep in mind, there is no distinction
between both; both distribute privileges, duties, no rights etc..). At this point we should not
envision the “rule of law” as a neutral project or a project with the sole aim of protecting
property rights. In fact, it is a part and parcel of wealth distribution in the economy and can shape
the distribution amongst sectors. The next section examines the other side of the coin associated
with the rule of law and reform; repression. Repression comes hand in hand with reform.
Consequently as the next section will argue legal reform cannot be assumed to be neutral and
without state involvement.
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B. Violence and Repression as Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Growth
In his book examining the transformation of Egyptian state during the fiscal crisis; Samir
Soliman charts a beneficial model that includes the transformation of the Egyptian state from a
well-fare state(or in his words Caretaker) to a “predatory” state.128 This transformation is
characterized by levying the revenues of the state during crises from the weakest segments of the
Egyptian political economy. There are two aspects that are related to Soliman’s model that can
be applied and highlighted. Firstly, predatory state practices started early in the 1980s; this
predatory approach has been evolving during the Mubarak reign in the 1980s. Secondly, through
this analysis, it can be seen that liberal notions of reform or “rule of law” provide protection to
certain actors in the political economy. Other actors i.e. the losers from this transaction end up
being the victims of different forms of state violence. This often depends on the perceived
bargaining power of each party and their reaction to the proposed reform.
In 1986, thousands from the auxiliary police forces went into protests in the streets, the
outbreak of violence and protest was met by decisive military force. At some instances military
planes were used against the auxiliary police forces. The incitement of protest had occurred
because the state had attempted to cut their waged labor and extend their service from three years
to five years.129
In many ways this incident embodies one of the first human sacrifices the
Egyptian state had to make; but it also highlights the role of instability within society due to the
incident’s economic impact. The police force was seen as a weak actor that can be used to
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impose fiscal discipline and provide a supply of labor for both projects and security. The
Egyptian regime back tracked on the proposed changes and had promised to provide the
conscripts with better services. The incident also signifies the role of political stability in
maintaining the Egyptian economy. A common target during the 1986 were hotels; primarily an
essential component of Egyptian tourism which represented one of Egypt’s rentier economy
pillars.
In order for the predatory state to function under conditions of crisis in the 1990s; it had
to repress the opposition from gaining access to political channels. This was specifically
conducted to allow for certain controversial IFI reforms to pass through Egyptian legislation.130
If anything, this was a replication attempt to acquire a similar parliament to Sadat’s in the 1970s.
This parliament would support any government plan that aims to aid the state in managing the
fiscal crisis. However, there were two incidents in 1993 and 1994 where the parliament had even
refused certain IMF recommendations on taxes.131 Despite those two exceptional moments, this
parliament should be examined in comparison to the two previous parliaments(1980s). The
1990s parliaments were practically empty of any opposition. This was due to the scathing
critique the election had received from professional syndicates, the judges club and the
opposition political parties.132
Another form violence revolves around the act of distributing legal rules on actors based
on their relative bargaining power; this distribution effectively leads to worsening living
standards (by this I mean starvation/poverty). But also it includes limiting the ability of workers
to negotiate for a better work environment, instead of sacrificing their lives operating in pollutive

130

See Eberhard, supra note 128 at 159-161
id at 156-161
132
id
131

43

industries. If anything, by weakening the workers bargaining power, the economy becomes
favorable to industries that are pollutive. The 1990s included several examples that included
legal distribution that aimed to disadvantage the workers. For example, the amendments to the
trade union law governing union elections. Kienle highlights that fixed term workers were not
allowed to participate in union elections; in his words; “hit hardest those workers who were
threatened by the reform of the public sector and privatization”.133 Moreover, a legal privilege
was given to the managers to join the rank of the unions; this had allowed them to dilute
membership in favor of economic liberalization. This highlights how the attempt to privilege the
private sector had led to the weaker position of workers especially those operating in heavy
industries.
The reform or the repression of the Egyptian state extended through its
distribution of taxes; this also is another form of violence that is distributed asymmetrically. This
is violence, because it primarily targeted lower classes in the Egyptian population denying them
sustenance and improvements in basic well-being.134 For example the general sales tax satisfied
liberal fantasies about equality of the rich and poor to consume the same commodities.
Moreover, Soliman highlights how the income taxes were levied mostly from those with paid
salaries from the government.135 Income tax was an indirect way to sustain the state without
upsetting the private sector with corrective measures such as the ones highlighted in the previous
use of the “second best theory”.
The state’s use of taxes in the Egyptian case indicates three important findings; firstly,
salaried employees contributed to 4% of the tax revenue, this was comparable to the same
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contribution made by both industry and commerce.136 Over 60% of taxes were obtained through
indirect taxation; through a general sales tax that affects the lower income groups more; Soliman
uses an old Arabic proverb to describe it as “spreading the blood between the tribes”.137
Secondly, the government privileged certain corporations and industries by simply not applying
the law. In 1998, the estimated amount of tax evasion was around 14 to 20 Egyptian billion
pounds a year. Despite having a prison sentence as a penalty for evasion; that penalty was never
executed.138
Thirdly, as Soliman comments on the 2005 tax; it was conducted with the neoclassical
rationale “To increase tax revenues you have to lower taxes.”139. In reality, this “successful”
reform was also nothing but another sham and spectacle of reform that does not relate to lived
realities. The tax primarily lowered the income of private sector entities in order to attract the
“savior” highlighted earlier in chapter one. This type of “partial reform” privileged companies by
lowering their taxes by nearly half. The end result was an increase in taxes that was celebrated by
the government. However, as Soliman highlights; “the devil always lurks in the details”; in
reality the tax achieved lower taxes from the private sector; the increase in taxes was actually
derived from taxation on the Suez Canal and an increase of taxation on gas.140 Another facade of
successful reform that was conducted under the guise of “partial reform” with neoclassical
underpinnings.
The previous paragraphs highlight different uses of law to contain dissent, to privilege the
private sector as well as distribute economic burdens asymmetrically. Those different uses
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became necessary conditions during economic liberalization. They all included forms of violence
either direct or indirect; this occurs through economic repression by worsening the living
conditions of the population to intolerable levels. It had also highlighted how the Egyptian state
performs during the implementation of economic liberalization. This performance attempts to
target with sometimes a trial and error approach the weakest segments of the population to
extort. This extortion occurs because it attempts to adhere to the principles of neoclassical
thought that aims to privilege the private sector; while taxing the population indiscriminately
affecting lower income groups.
C. Cleft Capitalism: A Product of Policy Choices and Efficiency.
“Cleft Capitalism…is more of an institutional condition of multiple coexisting business systems
in which market actors play with a different set of rules. This multiplicity differentially and
decisively affects the ability of enterprises to access inputs and grow. Under these parallel
arrangements, only those with a large initial or acquired endowment of private capital-- financial,
physical, human, political and social—could grow alongside a further politically connected
cronies.”141
Recently in 2020, Amr Adly published a remarkable study examining Egypt’s
development puzzle. His main focus was on the institutional arrangements within Egypt that
would allow certain busineses to grow while leaving Egypt’s large pool of SSEs and SMEs
stagnating and eventually losing groundThe term he coined for that was Cleft Capitalism).142
This section will crystalize some points of Adly’s work that would be beneficial for this thesis.
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Firstly, Adly makes an important argument is that Egypt’s economic strategy of private
sector empowerment did occur.143 However, this economic success did not lead to increases in
wellbeing(Or the empowerment of SSEs and SMEs in what is labeled the “missing middle
syndrome”).144 Secondly, there is a different critique against the proponents of the cronyism
arguments. The third point builds on Adly’s framework by emphasizing the role of law. I agree
with Adly that a set of rules govern each business subsystem ability to grow or improve. Those
sets of rules are in essence a product of law; each legal rule has a productive capacity. Those
legal rules were directed on purpose to segments that are assumed to be more productive: this
would primarily include large firms that are able to follow economies of scale for example.
Moreover, each legal system adopted can influence economic distributional aims. Fourthly, I
must highlight a disagreement with Adly, I disagree with parts of his valuable contribution. The
book underplayed the role of conditionalities and coercion on the international field.145
1. A Segmented Private Sector
Adly aimed to counter claims that Egypt did not transform into a successful capitalist
society (Examples of successful transformation are for example China or Malaysia).146 He relies
on a conservative source such as the Heritage Foundation to establish his argument. It is
highlighted that significant improvements in freedom of trade and the ability of private actors to
enter and operate a business with the least state regulation did occur. Moreover, he cites
commendations from the IMF and the World Bank as Egypt had succeeded in following their
conditions to gain funding. Adly drives his argument through by highlighting the dominance of
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the private sector when it came to contributing by 75% to non-hydrocarbon industries, 65.4 of
employments and the increase construction sector growth from 71% in 1991 to 89.1% in 2010.147
The justification offered as to why this success did not generate increases in wellbeing
was attributed to the “missing middle syndrome”. The missing middle syndrome postulates that
SSEs and SMEs lacked the institutional ability to gain investments (or loans) to grow. As a
result, SSEs and SMEs missed out on being integrated into a capitalist system. In such a system,
they would be exploited by the big businesses, this would lead to an overall “benefit”.
It is through the different business subsystems that Adly provides we see how the
institutional arrangement within neoliberal discourse operate to give the illusion of success. Adly
provides three subsystems: Cronies, Dandy and Balady. Cronies rely on political connections and
higher endowments to access credit. Below them in this hierarchy is Dandy capitalism. This
category consists of individuals or firms with access to capital that would allow them entry into
the finance system.
What is more relevant to this thesis is Balady capitalism. Balady capitalism does not have
access to the formal finance market. This leaves them with a variety of other options to acquire
credit. Often this leaves them exposed to higher transaction costs and being governed by
different legal regimes when it comes to credit access. While Adly surveys their inability to gain
credit, this thesis examines how the legal frameworks operate to secure the supply of credit away
from what is conceived to be formal institutions.. Balady capitalism shares similar attributes to
the case study of debtors in this thesis. For example, the bonds of friendship, family and local
society are heavily relied upon in order to access credit.
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The access to credit has been often through informal means because the institutional
arrangement such as banks and public land management agencies. The institutional arrangement
has been centralized (politically and geographically) and had ignored the interests of SSEs. This
situation privileged those with larger initial endowments of capital. Adly correctly point to a lack
of “complementarity”: complementarity is in this context means that vulnerable actors did not
posses enough capital to access more investment. Their situation is lacking because of higher
transaction costs.

2. Cronyism and The Role of External Factors
Adly offers a critique to cronyism different than the one envisioned in this thesis. It is
argued that cronyism and the absence of formal market institutions can not solely explain the
failure of reform programs in delivering suitable welfare.148 Drawing on a comparative insight
from Asia; he highlights that in countries such as South Korea, Malaysia and China development
had occurred despite (“and perhaps thank to”) special state-business ties.149 Emphasis on the
experience of Asian countries has been stressed. This emphasis centered mainly on the ability of
the institutions within those states to support SSEs and SMEs through local intermediaries that
would provide finance.150 Adly departs from the leftist accounts of underdevelopment that stress
that neoliberal policies themselves are the conditions of underdevelopment. Leftist accounts
according to Adly view the failure as the “logical outcome” (and not a “pathological deviation”
to quote Adly) of disbanding the welfare state and steering away from macroeconomic
Keynesian policies.
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Third, Cleft Capitalism is composed of rules that influence the distribution of resources.
This point highlighted by the book touches upon the main tenet of this thesis. In a legal neorealist
lens of analysis; legal rules have an ability to increase production; each legal rule can generate
capital for the privilege holder.
While the book discerns itself with national institutions and their role in suppressing
access to capital necessary for SSEs and SMEs to develop; what lies outside its scope are
external conditions that have an affect on that policy(Adly on purpose focuses on economic
sociology).151 For example, several World Bank publications during the 1990s placed conditions
on access to finance based on restricting the state’s ability to allocate capital.152 In essence, banks
were forced to adopt higher interest rates allowing for higher price of debt vis a vis equity.
Moreover, as a conditionality imposed from IFIs; the debt to equity ratio was increased from 1:9
and 1:10 to 1:2.153 The increase of both interest rate and debt-equity ratio fundamentally
disadvantages SMEs and SSEs who would need cheaper access to debt as well as a significant
amount of credit to grow.154 This legal rule while masquerading under the pretense of neutrality
restricted funding to a certain type of businesses. When the state’s ability to allocate funds is
limited, SSEs and SMEs may seek other sources of finance that offers credit arrangements at
higher costs. IMF measures aimed to create an environment of competitive investment between
actors: in this environment those who are better equipped with privileges will capture the market.
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As a result, legal rules were determined in deciding who was deemed to be more efficient in
running a business or those with political connections.
3. Points of Disagreement
I take issue with Adly’s critique of leftist accounts of the Egyptian economy. Firstly, the
book underplays the role of external conditions in policy; both Roccu and Cox are cited to
establish that the Egyptian state was not a transmission belt and that “domestic factors (were)
shaping the reforms as much as any external linkages or influences”. While I do agree that the
Egyptian state was not a mere transmission belt, I disagree on placing them on an equal footing
with “external linkages or influences”. This disagreement can be even supported by Roccu’s
account cited by prof. Adly. Roccu’s argument recognizes that the reform was “pushed down the
throat of the Egyptian government”. Roccu’s account explains how the Egyptian state managed
at times to articulate the reforms to preserve its power as an authoritarian regime. This
“articulation” occurred through delaying certain neoliberal reforms or privileging large capital
owners with a tax code that saves money. This level of interplay between external and internal
forces can be hardly described as two sides on an equal footing.
Second, prof Adly quotes Hansen’s World Bank study to critique the leftist discourse for
“underscoring” the productive side of state production or state led development. The study
produced by Hansen and specifically the pages depended upon are an outstanding example of
why World Bank policies failed in Egypt. Hansen critiques Mabro and Radwan for attempting to
calculate economic inefficiency; he argues for increased spending on housing contrary to the
five-year plan 1960-1965155. While Hansen recognizes the role of scarcity and access to finance
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necessary for new parts that Egyptian industries needed; he ideologically claims that
nationalization was the reason for the drop in productivity(instead of access to finance). The
former account of Hansen with regards to access to spare parts and finance can actually be
substantiated by accounts from Egyptian ministers of industry who emphasized a constant lack
of funding that prevented SOEs to grow similar to SSEs and SMEs lack of finance.
Third, there seems to be a confusion associated with the use of productivity. The way
productive sectors are understood in this thesis are sectors that are able to generate a trade
surplus. It is unclear whether the state-elite ties that improved upon certain manufacturing sectors
was productive. For example, the cement factories are often owned by foreign investors. The the
new towns being established in the construction boom ae unproductive on the basis of its
temporality (with regards to labor) and ability to generate much needed finance through foreign
currency.
Finally, Adly issues a totalizing judgment on Egypt’s access to finance. A plausible
argument is made that Egypt had received more cash inflows and funding than both Turkey and
Brazil. Prof. Adly in a correspondence with the writer of this thesis had highlighted how that
access of funding should counter the narrative deployed that Egypt lacked scarcity.
This approach while seeming plausible runs the risk of underplaying the conditions
associated with finance whether it was loans or aids. Moreover, in using the period of 1992 to
2012; the book runs the risk of totalizing the role of finance. To elaborate; it is necessary to
examine each period on it own accord and to pose the following questions; where was the money
used and what dynamics or legal rules had to change in order for that funding to be required.
This indicates a need for a comprehensive study to examine at each period the conditions, power
dynamics, and priorities of spending associated with the sum of 61 billion USD in funding
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highlighted by Adly. In addition, within the World Bank reports; the first reference to
microfinance appeared in 1998(To my knowledge); during the 1998 report; it was highlighted
that the region needs 1.4 billion USD in microfinance. What was being supplied was around 95
million USD.156 This is an outcome of “efficient” allocation of funding; bigger corporations and
those with social capital are able to capture state resources at the efficient interest rate and debtequity ratio. What has been excluded from realm of banking finances and pushed to the side has
been microfinance.
To conclude, prof. Adly provides a powerful framework that highlights the role of rules
in privileging certain segments within the private sector. This privileging that narrows down and
restricts access to capital is echoed in the case study presented in this thesis with Egyptian debt
prisoners. Moreover, the comparative insight provided by Adly highlights that relying on
accounts of cronyism is too simplistic to explain the failure of the Egyptian economy in terms of
welfare. The previous sections and the example of increases in interest rate/debt-equity ratio are
supplementary to the analysis by highlighting the role of external conditions in shaping access to
credit.
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III.

The Outcomes of Reform; Alienation and Violence Against Poverty.

A. Background On Egyptian Prisoners of Debt.
“that ‘nine tenths of murderers, thieves and idlers come from what we have called the social
base’ (Lauvergne, 337); that it is not crime that alienates an individual from society, but that
crime is itself further to the fact that one is in society as an alien”157 -Foucault
In the late 1990s; journalist Nawal Mostafa first shed light on the situation of Egyptian
women in prison; in particular those who she labeled “Women Prisoners of Poverty''.158 During
her visit to Al Qanatir women’s prison; she was shocked to discover a high amount of children
amongst the prison population.159 This had piqued her interest to investigate the situation of
women in the prison system; after months of negotiation with the Ministry of Interior she had
managed to survey their situation. She found that over 40% of female prisoners at the time were
there due to debt.160 This percentage increased significantly since Nawal last conducted her
research. This was due to the decline in overall living standards in the 1990s161 Worsening living
conditions and the new laws introduced in the 1990s evidently will lead to a higher percentage
than Nawal had reported in the 1990s.
Due to the authoritarian environment in Egypt; it is difficult to acquire accurate accounts
of prison population. According to the only recent academic thesis on the situation of Egyptian
debtors; we can not determine the numbers of debtors in prison to be precise.162 However, in just
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2019 there were around 59,000 released from jail because of debts arising from poverty.
Moreover, in just four years between 2014 and 2018; both Al Azhar’s NGO163 Masr El Kheir
and President El Sisi have managed to free 120,000 debtors from low socio-economic
backgrounds. The ministry of social solidarity has estimated that around 25% of the entire prison
population are women debtors.164 Research had also highlighted that around 65% of women
prisoners return to the prison after being set free from the first criminal sentence. It is worth
emphasizing that some of the numbers only include the number of women. Moreover, in the last
six years around 18 new prisons were built by the government to accommodate an increasing
prison population.165 The new prisons were not just built to accommodate Sisi’s political
opposition, but also to accommodate those who dare transgress on the “credit” system.
B. Lenses of Analysis and Objectives.
The situation of the Egyptian debtors stands as a symbol for the failure of liberal
economic policies. This failure can be witnessed through examining how their situation was
exacerbated by liberal reforms that maintained the image of the “savior”; with the purpose of
rectifying “partial liberal reform” errors. To elaborate, in order to empower the image of the
savior legal rules aimed to enhance the bargaining power of certain segments of society.
Instruments of debt were endowed with a higher productive ability to generate capital. This
institutional change resembles the difficulty SSEs and SMEs faced in accessing capital. In the
sense that debtors were disadvantaged when they needed to access credit.
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Similar to Adly’s institutional account; Katharina Pistor provides a detailed account of
the role of legal institutions in creating capital through privileges and entitlements. Pistor notes
four attributes the legal system endows upon property owners; “priority, durability,
convertibility, and universality.”166. Attributes such as priority matter in this specific legal reform
as the privilege of creditors took priority over previous claims of extenuating circumstances and
arguments of intent that were prevalent prior to the reform. The inclusion of context and intent
had provided debtors with room to maneuver. Moreover, attributes such as convertibility and
universiability have led to consequences in the Egyptian context as the state had sanctioned the
trading of debt instruments. This trading had often allowed creditors to abuse their privilege as
well be highlighted in the following sections. Those attributes lead to an entanglement between
legal rules and the production of capital; whereby the former aid in increasing the productivity of
the latter.
This chapter has three objectives, firstly, it examines the legal papers or channels through
which Egyptian debtors acquire debt that results in imprisonment sentences. It makes two
arguments; firstly, the reform program of the New Commercial Law strengthened the checks as a
legal channel that can be used to acquire debt, it had awarded it a higher degree of enforcement
and productivity through enlisting the state’s action to incarcerate defaulters of debt. Second, it
argues that imprisonment through debt asymmetrically affects vulnerable populations vis a vis
more financially capable segments or commercial actors.
It introduces certain categories of debtors that are affected by sharpening the tools of
credit available to creditors. It argues that the situation of certain categories has deteriorated due
to the withdrawal of the state leaving individuals vulnerable to economic shocks. Moreover, this
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deterioration was faced by heavy state intervention against the debtors through criminalizing
their situation in a bid to privilege the savior figure through the New Commercial Law.
Third, it examines the construction of debtor criminality and how that construction fits within
the rationale of the reform strategy proposed to “solve” the debtors’ problems. I argue that the
treatment of the debtors centered around neoclassical fantasies that aimed to privilege the
“savior” figure by sacrificing the population. The initial changes in the legal system mainly in
the New Commercial Law, were an extension of privileges awarded to the savior figure. This
asymmetrical distribution of privileges is further maintained within the reform strategy. I argue
that the reform examined by the Egyptian parliament also fits within the “partial reform”
rhetoric. As usual, it exemplifies the paradoxical reform approaches taken in Egyptian reform. It
does so by further placing the debtors in a cycle of debt while maintaining a rhetoric of reform
that does not express lived realities.
C. The Alienation of the Debtors’ through the Liberal Rule of Law
The recent research examining the situation of the debtors linked the New Commercial
law to the exacerbation of the debtors’ situation.167 This part pursues three avenues of research
related to debtors’ imprisonment with the aim of highlighting how the reform process led to an
increase in debtor incarceration. First, it engages in a comparative review of the three most
common tools usually undertaken to acquire debt in the Egyptian context. In specific, it relates
the use of certain commercial papers (checks) in the imprisonment of the debtors. This
relationship examines the rise in financial inclusion and consequently the rise in the use of
checks as tools of credit as highlighted in the cases of the previous section.
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Second, it will engage with the development of the check as one of the commercial
instruments related to the imprisonment of debtors. In doing so, it examines its development
from pre-reform to post reform through focusing on certain articles and legal rules that bear
direct relevance to the situation of the Egyptian prisoners of poverty. This examination aims to
illustrate how the New Commercial law has managed to empower creditors through changes in
certain legal rules. I argue that the development of law along with the court cases have led to a
shift in privileges that disadvantaged debtors using checks or commercial papers for civil uses.
Finally, it evaluates the use of security receipts within penal law to highlight how not only
security receipts aid to further empower creditors, but they also operate in practice in a manner
that has not been envisioned in the law.
1. Channels to Acquire Debt
Access to credit in Egyptian society and law is dependent on income, each segment in
society has a legal/financial channel that can be used to access credit. Members of the
business community can use either the banks for a line of credit or place installments in their
contractual obligations. Similarly, individuals with a stable job, savings and a credit history
are able to utilize credit options through either credit cards or loans that are based on salaries
to guarantee it. On the other hand, the rise is prisoner of poverty is synonymous with the rise
of the predatory state and liberal reform. The use of legal papers to acquire debts either for
household and emergencies arose out of worsening living conditions and the retreat of the
public sector. For example, household equipment and medical expenses are two items the
Egyptian state before its transformation into a predatory state had offered either for free or at
subsidized rates.
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Vulnerable segments of Egyptian society have to rely on mainly three legal means to
acquire credit using both the commercial law and the penal law. Two of those means are
considered commercial papers in the New Commercial Law and the third falls within the Penal
law. The two legal papers within the New Commercial Law are bills of exchange/draft168 and
checks. The general focus in his section is on checks due to the rise of Egyptians accessing the
banking system. Moreover, checks are considered to be more reliable by creditors to guarantee
debt over bills of exchange for the following reasons. Firstly, a check has only one date; the date
of issue which makes it more efficient than a bill of exchange that would have a due date at a
different time than issuance. Secondly, a check places an immediate legal obligation on the
debtor vis a vis the bill of exchange whereby the position of the debtor is considered before
release of funds(Priority). For example, a creditor does not have to get a final approval from a
debtor, while with a check no pre-approval is required. Finally, according to the New
Commercial Law the check has a main characteristic of depending on a bank to gain its value as
a legal document.
In the New Commercial Law, article 534 allows for imprisonment with a 50,000 EGP fine or
either of those two punishments. However, the debtors who often default because of inability to
cover small installments, are unlikely to pay the fine which ultimately leads to a prison sentence.
Second, they can also face imprisonment through the use of security receipts as envisioned in the
Egyptian penal law through article 341. Article 341 falls within the category of theft and
Usurpation in the criminal law and it allows for a 100 EGP fine and a maximum prison sentence
of 3 years for each security receipt.
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The Penal law allows for a different avenue aside than New commercial law for debtor
imprisonment. Some might argue that Penal law is a more effective avenue because of the lack
of financial inclusion in Egypt. However, recent research and news reports highlighted an
increase in the use of checks in interactions resulting in imprisonment.169 This is further
supported by the cases highlighted in the next section. It is often the breadwinner of the family or
one adult within the single household that has access to credit. Millions of Egyptians before the
focus on financial inclusion had bank accounts ranging from 10-12% of the adult populations. In
recent years due to financial inclusion being high on the development agenda, around 32% of
Egyptian adults have bank accounts and easy access to checks.170 Any individual is entitled to
access a check book of 25 checks upon opening a bank account. The price of the check is 1.8
EGP. Therefore, it becomes easy for individuals whether salaried employees, informal labor and
generally any section of the population from low income brackets to extreme poverty to gain
access to checks.
Both security receipts and checks allow for avenues of imprisonment; there is no data on
whether the bulk of the cases are because of security receipts or checks. However, it must be
understood that both are tools available for both creditors and debtors to engage in contractual
relations (by contractual relationships; I mean the use of a check or a security receipt as a
guarantee of payment for medical expenses or equipment used for personal use). If anything,
checks can be considered more reliable by creditors for two reasons; they are official documents
issued by a bank; therefore, the debates on whether someone would sign a blank security receipt
is limited. They can be a representation of money which allows for easier compensation than
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using a security receipt to entrust someone on a depreciable commodity or an amount of money.
Furthermore, security receipts as tool of imprisonment falls under scrutiny if witnesses attest that
they were produced as a result of debt agreement or an agreement between individuals and not an
act of trust. As a result, the proceedings move away from penal law jurisdiction to civil law.
Finally, they allow for compensation (50,000) that will often be higher than the amounts
borrowed in the majority of debtor cases as well as imprisonment.
2. Development of the Checks in Legal Reform and Case law.
The following sections analyze the several bodies of law governing debt and credit
relations. Prior to the New Commercial Law171, articles 60, 337 and 341 were utilized in
conjunction with the old commercial law172. Within the old commercial law articles 2, 141 and
191 were engaged to define the nature of debtor-creditor dealings and to assert the value of debt
instruments as replacements of money. To illustrate how the system has operated I have relied on
two cases. The first, Appeal 879; Court of Cassation in 1952173 highlights the linkages between
both penal law and the old commercial law. The second case Appeal 27024; Court of Cassation
1998174 examines possible exceptions permitted prior to the reform that would preclude prison
sentences. Those exceptions allowed at certain times for the check to be used as a tool of credit
and for the engagement of civil courts thereby not necessitating an imprisonment sentence.
The shift in the Commercial law included the use of article 8, 65, 105, 473, 500, 501,
502, 503, 534. Those article provided an extended framework that award creditors more
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privileges. This was particularly manifested in the following cases :Appeal 62163; Court of
Cassation, 2007175,Appeal 11423; Court of Cassation 2014176 and Appeal 14451; Court of
cassation, 2014.177. Those cases featured the application of the law without exceptions that
provided for differentiation based on the use (for civil or commercial purposes), it also included
measures that would accommodate for force majeure.
The first objective of this part is to highlight the previous linkage that had existed within
the old commercial law. Second, it examines the exceptions within the laws concerning
imprisonment that had existed before the reforms. Those exceptions allowed at certain times for
the check to be used as a tool of credit and for the engagement of civil courts thereby not
necessitating an imprisonment sentence. Third, it compares the changes within the law and how
the new reform responded to previous debates and had abrogated certain previous exceptions that
allowed for the engagement of civil law thereby preventing incarceration for debt. In doing so,
the reforms awarded more privileges to creditors; those privileges would eventually lead to the
exacerbation of the situation of the debtors.
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3. Pre-Reform
The check was not explicitly mentioned in the old commercial law which was
promulgated in November 1883. The check was explicitly mentioned in the penal law of 1937 in
article 337178. Article 337 states that an individual who has written a check that does not
correspond to an amount that is withdrawable with bad intention shall face legal sanctions (i.e
prison sentence for each legal paper).
In 1952 the court of cassation linked article 337 in the Penal law to the definition of
commercial papers in the old commercial law; in specific article 191.179 Aside from linking the
definition of the check from the penal law and the commercial law the court reaffirmed that
checks replace money and they can not be used as tools of credit.180 In 1952 use of the check as a
tool of transactions was not widely popular between the Egyptian population, let alone
vulnerable segments.181
Despite the previous linkage in 1952; the penal allowed for certain exceptions to be
deployed that prevent imprisonment. Article 60 states that penal law sanctions can not be used
against individuals who committed acts with sound intention.182 Moreover, within article 337;
there is also a secondary exception on the intention of the issuer of the check.
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Through this linkage the position of the check was undermined vis a vis other
commercial papers highlighted in article 191.183 Certain contractual relations that are violated
because of emergencies and or dire conditions of living would not qualify for a prison sentence
under the linkage between penal and commercial pending the introduction of context. However,
this linkage also differentiated the check from other commercial papers; specifically article 148.
Article 148 highlights that the only exceptions available for non payment of a commercial paper
is the paper being lost of the bankruptcy of the issuer.
4. Exceptions Within the Law and Debate Before the Reform
It was not lost on the lawyers nor on the judges that the law had allowed for more
exceptions to the payment of the check. For example, the court Cassation in 1998184 had noted
that a debtor who had issued checks with the intention of using them as guarantees; did not
intend to relinquish control over them, but had used them as tools to guarantee payment. In doing
so, the court distinguished the intent of the debtor in the transaction to issue the check as a
guarantee for future payment.185 In that specific case the court recommended that the case be
transferred from the penal court to a civil jurisdiction.186 In doing so the court created a
distinction between two uses of commercial papers; firstly, it’s use for trading in commercial
matters and as an immediate representation of money. Second, it had distinguished a different
use as a guarantee within a contract which would then fall under civil transactions; thus the role
of criminal law in incarceration was limited. This is a similar situation to all the cases reported
earlier in the previous section.
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Furthermore, it was argued that article 2 of the old commercial law did not distinguish
between the use of a check for a commercial purpose and a commercial purpose.187 Specifically
article two highlighted that transactions have to fall within a commercial nature to fall within the
commercial law sphere. Moreover, article two did not specify checks, while it specify other how
other commercial papers would fit and had detailed their properties and mechanisms of
enforcement. Thus it was not possible to deduce from the commercial law prior to 1999 whether;
the check was entirely within commercial law jurisdiction even when used for civil purposes; i.e
for urgent medical operations or buying essential household equipment for personal use or
whether it falls within a strict commercial use similar to article 148.
5. Post Reform
The New Commercial Law embodies the legal philosophy of the second moment of Law
and Development. In that sense; the law embodies the preferential treatment on all levels to
creditors; this assumption is laid out explicitly in the articles of the law, in court cases as well as
in the legal commentaries whether by academics or drafters.188 This new law extended prison
liability towards all commercial papers not just checks and clarified a previous ambiguity in the
law that differentiated the treatment of debtors who used any commercial paper on the basis of
its use.189 The legal commentary on the New Commercial Law; the law aimed to “ Return back
the respect to the check as well as adding to the paper the certainty by making it a permanent
legal obligation”(Durability). The following paragraphs will go through the articles highlighted
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in the table and how they aim to privilege creditors or the savior figure through turning a blind
eye of vulnerable debtors.
Article 8 responds directly to the exception in article 2 in the old commercial law by
highlighting that all the commercial actions of a creditor/trader are commercial acts.190 In doing
so it has eliminated the conditionality imposed on non-traders or debtors in this situation from
falling within the bounds of commercial law when they are conducting transactions of civil
nature(Priority of claims-privileges manifested in the choice of bodies of law).
Article 65 reiterates parts of the judgments of the court of cassation by highlighting that
checks and other commercial papers can replace either money or commodities. In doing so it also
establishes the privilege for creditors in this specific case to engage in trading of both checks and
commercial papers taken as guarantees from the debtors. Nivert highlights how in certain cases,
the debtors after paying a considerable amount of money towards repayment of debt, certain
creditors trade the checks and the debtor is forced not only to deal with a new creditor, but also
they are also forced to pay the whole amount again.191
I have included article 105192 in the table although it does not pertain to the debtors
situation; I argue that this article highlights the preferential treatment awarded to the “savior”
figure, by allowing more avenues aside than imprisonment to traders in their commercial

Mādẗ (8) (1) al-aʿmāl al-lty yaqwm bihā al-tāǧr lišuʾwn tataʿlaq bi-taǧārtih tuʿad aʿmālan tuǧāriyaẗ. (2) kul ʿmal 190
yaqwm bih al-tāǧir yuʿad mutaʿliqan bi-tǧārtih mā lam yuṯbat ġayr ḏalik
“Matters conducted by the trader relating to his business are commercial matters, any matters conducted by the
trader are related to his commerce until proven otherwise”
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Mādaẗ (105) 1- iḏā lam yadfaʿ al-muštary aḥd aqsāṭ al-ṯaman al-mutafq ʿalyh falā yaǧwz al-ḥukm bi-fasẖ al-bayʿ 192
iḏa tabyyan anhu qām bi-tanfyḏ ẖamsatin wa sabʿyyn fy al-miʾāh min al-tizāmātih. 2- wa fy ḥālaẗ al-ḥukm bi-fasẖ
al-bayʿ yaǧb an yarud al-baʾiʿ al-aqsāṭ al-laty qabḍahā baʿd istnzāl mā yuʿādil ʾuǧraẗ al-intifāʿ bil-mabyʿ bil-iḍāfaẗ
ilā taʿwyḍ ʿan al-talf alḏy laḥqhu bisabab al-istʿmāl ġayr al-ʿādy. Wa yaqʿ bāṭlan kul itfāq ʿlā taḥmyl al-muštarā altizāmāt ašd min ḏalik. 3- al-itfāq ʿlā ḥulwl al-ṯamn biʾakmalih ʿind ʿadam dafʿ aḥd al-aqsāṭ fy miyʿād istḥqāqih lā
yakwn nāfiḏan ilā iḏā taẖlaf al-muštary ʿan dafʿ qisṭayn mutataliyayn ʿlā al-aql
(In the case of non repayment of installments, the contract is not rendered invalid if a trader has paid 75% of the .
obligagtions,..
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dealings with each other. The article reviews the contractual relationship between two parties
that are within the private sector. The law seems more lenient to two traders/creditors dealing in
commercial relations vis a vis individuals engaged in the same relationship, but using
commercial papers for personal purposes or consumption. Under this rule; one of the two parties
who “buys” on credit is allowed leeway; this is not the same case for debtors who use checks for
a similar transaction. Once the bank informs the creditor that the check does not have a
corresponding value, the debtors are placed at the mercy of both the judicial system and the
creditor. There are no extensions nor is there leeway that would protect them in situations of
force majeure.
Article 473 provides a definition for the check and its properties. In doing so it aimed to
exclude hand written checks; and allow checks to be only issued through the banks. This was
conducted with the aim of limiting written checks for circulation. It was understood that checks
issued by the bank carry more certainty and are more reliable.
Article 500,501 and 502 extend the same obligations of repayment of checks to
warrantors; this extends the obligations and imprisonment to other individuals who often happen
to be a family member. The articles highlight how checks have the ability to have warrantor.
Those warrantors are as equally liable through the law for payment of the checks. Therefore, an
entire family could lose its natural legal guardians whenever the husband or the wife chooses to
rely on a check for debt and the partner would sign as a warrantor. This has been highlighted in
several cases, it is often the wives of the male breadwinner who assume the capacity of signing
as warrantors.193
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Article 503 represented the jurisprudence of the court of cassation manifested in 1952;
and it conformed with the previous article 148 of the old commercial law. However, it a had a
distinct difference; this article was specifically designed to deny exceptions of intent and context
from being evaluated by the courts. This article addressed specifically the reasoning and defenses
deployed in the 1998 case that had withdrawn the jurisdiction of the penal law allowing civil law
to replace it and thus place an end to imprisonment. This was specifically highlighted in all the
cases highlighted in the post reform period in the table. All were treated under criminal
jurisdiction(yes despite being used under commercial law REVIEW CASE BELOW); they were
awarded criminal sentences by the court and the court highlighted the reasons and intentions of
debtors.194
Finally article 534195 represents the mirror image of article 337; it allows for both
imprisonment sentences as well as a 50,000 fine to be in conjunction with each other; or each
separately. As stressed before the fine option is unrealistic especially because as will be
highlighted in the debtors’ categories in the next section; they are often unable to pay the fine.
To summarize, in the early 1950s, the court of cassation had linked the penal law to the
definition established within the old commercial law. In doing so it had involved the penal law in
commercial transactions and had undermined the value and certainty of the check. This
effectively led to a debate and rulings that disengaged penal law from applying to the checks.
Consequently, this disengagement relegated the checks to the jurisdiction of the civil law
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preventing incarceration. However, as the New Commercial Law was introduced with a rationale
to privilege the savior figure over the the majority of the population. The exceptions pertaining to
checks that examine the context and intent of debtors were removed from consideration. The
court cases after 1999 reflect this rationale in dealing with check and other commercial papers.
This rationale moves along the lines of providing continuous privileges to the savior figure
through excluding the use of legal documents as credit guarantees or allowing for urgent
situations or economic shocks to factor into consideration.196
6. Security Receipts as a Replacement for Contractual Relations.
Another conduit of debtor imprisonment is through article 341 in the penal law. Through
this article, debtors sign a paper admitting that they have taken into their custody a specific
monetary amount representing a physical asset or a sum of money. This is often labeled as a
security receipt; within the law, this receipt can be conducted through either a two-way
relationship or a three-way relationship. For example, individual X entrusts individual Y to
deliver a package to individual Z. Individual Y fails to deliver the package; therefore, individual
X is entitled to sue individual Y under the Egyptian penal law article 341. In this situation; a
breach of trust occurs due to the nature of the security receipt. In another case X entrusts Y with
a specific package for a duration of time, on the condition that it is returned when individual X
asks for it. However, as highlighted to me by several judges at the higher levels of adjudication;
the witnesses often used to testify on the original interaction often vindicate the debtor by
highlighting that the transaction was contractual (as a guarantee for money repayment or
repayment on commodities for personal use), not an act of trust.
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Security receipts offer another layer of privileges to creditors, this occurs because of three
distinct features available to security receipts. Firstly, similar to checks and commercial papers
they are not used in the manner envisioned in the law. They were envisioned as legal papers that
guarantee an act of “trust”; when they are juxtaposed in private relations between individuals
they become effectively tools of the market. In this sense, their use has been geared towards the
purchase of household equipment and taking loans. This is because a transactional relationship
occurs whereby individual Y, purchases equipment or borrows a sum of money. Individual X
includes within this transaction an interest rate; and in certain cases uses an increased price to
induce payment of debtors.
Second, the use of security receipts allows for several prison sentences to be handed
down for a single transaction. Simply put, the law allows for individuals committing the action
of “entrusting” to divide the amount in several receipts. In doing so, the creditors can use the
numbers of receipts to pursue a higher sentencing in years. This also allows the creditors to
coerce debtors that through the legal system through threatening the deployment of the prison
system to incarcerate them for a long number of years. several prison sentences can be issued for
the same transaction. This is also a similarity also shared between receipts and checks.
Finally, a large number of cases involving the use of security receipts can be conducted in
different geographical areas. Often in primary courts, the court issues a judgment based on a
breach of “trust” due to lack of input from debtors (Sometimes they are not aware of the case). If
the debtor is financially capable of further pursuing the case, the appeals court considers the
testimony of possible witnesses who would attest that the receipt was not used as a tool of trust.
If and when debtors are capable of proving the nature of the transaction as a contractual
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relationship, then the matter gets transferred to civil law similar to previous cases the penal law
had dealt with.
To conclude, security receipts offer another privilege along with checks. They serve an
auxiliary function whenever the use of checks is non-existent. It is often preferred whenever
debtors do not have access to bank checks (as written checks have been recently removed from
the market). It also severs as an alternative that can substitute or work concurrently with the use
of commercial papers. They are used in a contrary way to how they were envisioned to operate
within the law. The likely cause of this would be the change in living standards leading
individuals to become vulnerable to coercion from creditors and traders. Moreover, the status of
the debtors often disadvantage them when it comes down to the use of the legal system as it
requires both time, money, effort and most importantly evidence to prove the nature of the
relationship was transactional and not one of trust.
D. Empirical Evidence on the Causes of Debtor Imprisonment and Case Law
The recent research available on the debtors attempted to categorize the types of “poverty
prisoners of debt” within Egyptian prisons.197 This section is concerned with highlighting how
Egyptian law interacts with those debtors leading to their incarceration. It is worth emphasizing
that due to the deterioration in economic conditions due to liberal reforms; the most vulnerable
populations were most affected. This assumption is supported by the ministry of solidarity’s data
that women in poverty constitute 25% of the Egyptian prison population.
This section has two objectives; firstly to narrow down the segment of the debtors most
vulnerable to the changes in the legal system ;i.e. awarding creditors more privileges. This is
conducted through examining the categories of debtors established in recent literature by
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research in the field. The purpose of this exercise is to counter the fallacious narratives
constructing poverty debtors as criminals. Second, the section aims to highlight through
examining several cases of law the interaction between debtors and the legal system and what
relevant legal papers are used in their imprisonment. In doing so I pose two arguments; firstly,
the vast majority of the debtors fell into debt through transactions of civil nature or arising from
urgency(which is often associated with instability). Second, the debtors lacked enough protection
through legal means to guarantee them fair treatment; this is conducted through state inaction
towards the privileges of creditors.

1. Categories of Debtors
Recent literature has divided debtor prisoners of poverty into three categories.198 The first
two categories involve the use of debt in specific circumstances. However, the third category
highlights the existence of a general collateral damage that ensues from a contractual
relationship. This damage includes the imprisonment of additional individuals not belonging to
the first two categories. The first category entails a family member often a parent or a legal
guardian wishing to fulfill cultural obligation within a marriage.199 Those obligations include the
purchase of household appliances on credit. In order for the creditors/traders to sell on credit;
they utilize either checks or security receipts as guarantees for payment. In this sense, the head of
the household becomes liable for paying installments and with each installments, he/she receives
a check for the amount.200
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Second category is a direct product of the deteriorating economic conditions especially in
the economy characterized by a cycle of poverty and dependency on loans.201 This category
resorts to debt in order to satisfy urgent immediate needs. Through legal papers available, the
debtors take debt either through borrowing money or purchasing equipment and reselling it at a
loss. The debtors use legal tools as guarantees for payment in the form of commercial papers,
checks and security receipts.202 They go through this process due to dire events such as a death of
a family member, or a family member requiring an urgent operation or medication. In a way,
they are coerced to partake in that agreement out of desperations and due to the worsening
economic conditions.203
The final category includes warrantors; those individuals have no stake in the transaction,
but act as a guarantor for repayment in case the main party in the transaction defaults.204 A large
portion of those warrantors are mostly other family members within the household. Those family
members sign as a warrantor to the check in order to guarantee repayment. One case that
exemplifies the spread of debt within households include the imprisonment of an entire family
through a debt taken up by the father. The wife was a guarantor, she had defaulted, her guarantor
was her older daughter, who was also guaranteed by her younger daughter.205 Creditors resort to
those redundancies in the use of credit papers in order to extort debtors through the legal system.
The consequence and the outcome of this is the imprisonment of secondary individuals to the
main transaction.
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2. Debtors in Legal Cases and Causes of Imprisonment.
The six cases highlighted below exemplify certain themes that represent some lived
experiences that are often shared between the categories of debtors described above. Firstly, debt
is often attributed to the sudden emergence of medical emergencies, food shortages, severe
economic downturn, increases in poverty, unstable job access, discrimination based on gender
and illiteracy. Some assume that they can pay for dowries or necessary furniture in the household
in installments, but due to economic downturns, they default.206 This can also happen through
increased interest charged by creditors.207 We know in the case of Egypt that women are the
most vulnerable when it comes to economic shocks.208 This is either represented by instability of
jobs; in times of crisis and unemployment it is often the men that find jobs easier.209
Furthermore, the increases in food prices as well as the rise in poverty have led a higher
proportion of Egyptians into poverty.
I rely on the interviews conducted by NGOs as well as interviews collected by El Sherif
in the recent and the only academic work I had found on Egyptian debtors.210 The first case
involves a mother taking a loan and securing it through checks to conduct an urgent eye surgery
for her child. She was unable to pay due to heavy interest this resulted in her imprisonment for
16 years.211
The second case has a similar aspect whereby the woman buys house appliances and
resells it for a lower price in order to pay for the husband’s operation. The wife purchases the
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appliances through checks that guarantee payment through installments for the appliances. The
husband dies later; the house loses the breadwinner and she is unable to pay neither the interest
nor the principal payments. She received a sentence of 7 years for a checks amounting to 7,000
EGP, the original amount was 2,000 EGP.212 In this specific case; there is a hike in the price of
the original amount due to the dire necessity of the debtor in this situation; which ultimately
leads to increased coercion by the creditor. This occurs because of state inaction in restricting the
creditor’s bargaining power or ability to call upon the state to exercise a seven year sentence.
The third and fourth cases share a similarity whereby women were used as collateral for
the purchases conducted by their husbands. In the third case, the creditor insists that the wife sign
as a principal debtor while the husband will pay for a “Tuktuk”. Before the completion of
installments the husband is involved in an accident and dies, the wife as the guarantor is
obligated to repay the installments checks as warrantor She received a four year prison sentence
for inability to pay.
The fifth case features a 63 year old mother of six children using checks to gain credit
installments; this is in order to buy appliances for her daughter. Her total receipts after paying a
large part of the loan; over the amount; is 5515 EGP.213 She is sentenced to two years in prison.
Finally, I will conclude with a case of a man sentenced to 98 years in prison for checks of 2,800
EGP; the check was used for civil purposes; he had in 2002 purchased electrical appliances and
had sold them when economic conditions worsened. This last case; the man was pardoned after
spending 15 years in prison for a 2,500 EGP loan.214 At this point I have to highlight that the
government claims to spend around 3,500 monthly on each prisoner.215
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The previous cases highlighted the context of urgency and necessity that lead the debtors
to take debt. It had also highlighted how those conditions lead them to unfavorable debt
conditions; this includes high interest and higher amounts exceeding the borrowed amount. More
importantly it highlights how the vast majority of debtor prisoners fall into debt through
transactions that include the use of checks or security receipts as a guarantee for payment in a
contractual relationship. It also highlights how the purpose of borrowing has been consistently
conducted for civil purposes.
E. Construction of Debtors in Neoliberal Fantasies of Reform.
The situation of the debtors is a product of the legal system, however, there are reasons
why their plight is rendered invisible. Their plight is seen as a necessary condition for the
functioning of the economic system. Therefore as a result, they had to embody certain attributes
of deviancy and purposeful defiance to established rules. One of those attributes which seems
familiar claims that debtors have “sovereignty” or an ability to make a choice without coercion.
Moreover, the economic system has managed to exclude certain aspects of criminality from
certain debtors while maintaining the status of others. This has been a recurrent theme in
Egyptian reform and it can best be examined through the Egyptian state and World Bank
approaches to the debtors’ issue.
In 2017, a delegation composed of NCW members and several state NGOs presented
Egypt’s national strategy to empower women in line with the development vision of 2030.216 The
situation of women in prison and women in poverty was mentioned twice in two bullet points
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216
Egypt Today, NCW presents Egypt's women empowerment 2030 in Geneva

76

amongst a 74 page document.217 In that same document; the authors (NCW) were proud to
highlight that they have managed to reach 72,000 women to learn about their most basic
needs.218 According to the image they have constructed of the two bullet points concerning
women in prison; it would seem that none of those 72,000 women were members of the debtor
prison population.
The first bullet point addressing the situation of women in prison in the government’s
strategy; highlighted the importance of providing necessary health care for elderly women.219
The word “elderly” was emphasized in italics; as if to indicate that all other women in prison
receive necessary access to health care. The same point highlighted also the importance of
allowing visitation of children; special emphasis was given to a certain group of children
“especially those under the age of 15”.220 However, the second bullet point addressed the
situation of women prisoners of poverty directly. It did so; by ignoring the definition of calling
them prisoners of poverty. One of the few sentences in italics in the entire document emphasized
that women are in prison because “unplanned borrowing”.221 The proposed situation was to
“raise their awareness about their rights within the Egyptian legal system”. It somehow assumed
that debtors are not aware that taking on debt is not desirable in general. Furthermore and more
importantly it had ignored the fact that debtors take loans or use commercial papers in order to
resolve immediate urgent needs.222 Finally, it has established a binary whereby; if they are not
ignorant and insist on using the system then they must be criminal.
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There is an inherent disconnect between how reformers envision deviance and criminality
depending on the wealth of the individual; this is highlighted through the selective treatment of
debtors. Similar to the use of the taxes asymmetrically highlighted by Soliman, the World Bank
as well as Egyptian society decided to privilege certain debtors by exempting them from state
action initiated by creditors.
The World Bank in a recent strategy dedicated a large section to address a certain
segment of debtors. Moreover, it had attacked several parts of the New Commercial Law that
was first established for businessmen, but also extended to include civil matters. The Bank’s
strategy made two references that address the women debtors; the first relied on exacerbating
their situation in accordance with the financial inclusion initiative. For example, the bank praised
article 2 of the new investment law that granted equal access to finance to all women. More
importantly, the bank addressed certain debtors; those who own businesses and are worth more
than one million EGP. Similar to the earlier tone of reforms noted by Mitchell in the 1990s when
banks only awarded credit to projects that surpassed one million EGP.223 However, in this case,
this new law targeting this specific segment of debtors should be understood in the development
of Egyptian law. Specifically, the law abrogated the entirety of chapter 5 of the New Commercial
Law concerning insolvency and bankruptcy.
The new law extended protection from imprisonment to businesses that are worth more
than one million EGP. The document highlighted in bold that this protection from prison was to
be extended to the consignors and warrantors; whom they recognize are often women (mothers
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and wives). The purpose of the law according to a speech given by Shalakny law firm in AUC;
was to de-stigmatize the situation of the debtors. To this end; the law adopted chapter 11 of the
US bankruptcy code.
At this point; it is worth emphasizing the New Commercial law was established
especially for businessmen; yet, when the law was abrogated only the vulnerable socio-economic
classes were left with the stigma of debt and the image of the “criminal” or “ignorant”. In fact
the new law places significant access on entrepreneurial skills; it also assumes that if you fail to
gain from the law; it is because of a lack of business skills.
1. Reform and the Continuous Privileging of the “Savior”
In the last two years; three laws were introduced to parliament with the aim of solving the
debtors’ prison crisis. All three laws recognize that prison is not a solution. Instead they propose
an alternative “justice” measure that includes forced labor outside of the prison. The most likely
law to be adopted has been sponsored by several MPs widely known for their support of the
government. The drafter of the new reform is also President Sisi’s brother law; judge Sameh
AbdelHakam. The aim of this section is to provide an evaluation of the legal rules embodied in
the reform. I argue that they constitute a continuation of privilege of the “savior” figure; they
also serve as a further extension of “partial reform” imagination. Moreover, this specific reform
relies on an international document as the basis for reform, specifically the “United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures”(Hereinafter the Tokyo rules). I argue that
the use of this document is unsuitable in the case of Egyptian debtors. The new reform proposal
will symbolize another failure if it ignores the root causes of debtor’s imprisonment.
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The new law is composed of twenty five articles that aim to switch the punishment from
prison incarceration to alternative justice measures. Article 2 defines the alternative punishments
in seven criteria; each of them is available for the judge to exercise; they are as follows224;
1- Community Service (Or roughly translated from Arabic working for public benefit)
2- House arrest
3- Movement Restrictions
4- A limitation on contact to certain entities, persons or institutions
5- Being subject to electronic monitoring
6-Attendance of rehabilitation and training centers
7- Correcting the damage from the crime.
Firstly, although the objective of the law was to abide by the principles laid out in the Tokyo
rules; it had selectively excluded certain alternative punishments. For example, the first item on
the list of alternative punishments in the Tokyo rules was “Verbal sanctions, such as
admonition, reprimand and warning”. Instead this was replaced by a conception of “public
service” in the Egyptian law to become the first item on the list of punishments. This constitutes
a further indication of the state’s insistence to empower the “savior” by deploying harsher
measures than the ones envisioned in the Tokyo rules.
Second, the Tokyo rules allowed for “Economic sanctions and monetary penalties, such
as fines and day-fines” and “ Confiscation or an expropriation order”. The exclusion of those
articles indicates a recognition of the dire situation of Egyptian debtors. However, that
recognition is only limited to the space of alternative punishments. It is not extended to the
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definition of deviance associated with debtors; simply because the punishment aims to act as a
disciplinary tool towards individuals suffering from conditions beyond their control.
Third, while the law seems to provide a variety of legal punishments; the main focus of
the law is on “community service”; moreover, the law in article 14 does not exclude the
possibility for two alternative punishments operating in conjunction. The example given included
the use of both house arrest with community service. The law defines community service as a
work day that is determined by three ministries; the minister of interior, justice and social
solidarity. The law does not pose a definite obligation in providing this “community service” in a
related field.
Fourth, the proposed alternative punishments in the Tokyo rules state specifically that
punishments should not be blindly transplanted; according to article 1.3; punishments must
consider “the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of each country”. Consequently,
the situation of the Egyptian debtors culminates from an overall fallacious reform strategy. This
reform strategy has continually led to increase in both poverty and inequality. This reform
program is proposed at a time whereby a third of Egyptian live in extreme poverty and this is
only according to the statistics provided by the government. The Tokyo rules were drafted to
combat crime, the only crime of the debtors is falling victims to liberal reform. This is not a
crime that necessitates the alternative punishments in the Tokyo rules, it certainly does not
necessitate imprisonment.
Fifth, in a recent interview featuring Nawal Mostafa; she had expressed her amazement at
the sudden and recent increase in legal proposals.225 She had highlighted that it was not
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productive to have three laws offered to parliament as it would hinder the delivery of an
immediate solution.226 Mostafa had a similar proposal of reform also submitted to parliament,
however, it is unlikely that it will be adopted. AbdelHakam’s proposal risks certain abuse of
power in comparison to Mostafa’s law that relatively places women in safer “community
service” environments. To elaborate on my argument on AbdelHakam’s law; it leaves too much
authority in the hands of administrative bodies that can place debtors(and specifically women) in
more hostile environments than orphanages and hospitals.
To summarize, the law has managed to exclude the least possible punishments within the
Tokyo rules. Moreover, the reform ignored the possible exemptions within Tokyo rules that
place emphasis on the social, political and economic contexts of the debtors. In fact, the Tokyo
rules are designed to combat crimes. The situation of the debtors is not because of volitional
criminality, but due to economic pitfalls that had originated from depending on “partial reform”
and the “savior” figure. The new law by ignoring the mechanisms of civil law and maintaining
the privileges of the creditors by guaranteeing state intervention maintains the same fallacious
assumptions of reform that had produced the situation the reform aims to remedy.
2. The Predatory State in Debtor Imprisonment and Reform
The predatory state model highlights how the state during crisis attempts to target and
disadvantage vulnerable groups in favor of the “savior” figure. The situation of the debtors
occurred primarily as a product of the predatory state attempting to privilege creditors. Similarly
the reform envisioned is stemming from the predatory state model. The state transforms its
control over the debtor populations and maintains the same privileges for creditors. Moreover,
the predatory state in both scenarios was motivated by fiscal crisis. Mostafa has been working on
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the debtors’ issue since the 1990s, however, it had only gained traction after Egypt had signed
the IMF deal in 2016. This section examines the rationale of the reform and illustrates that not
only that reform falls into previous approaches taken by the predatory state, but also seems to be
contradicting the objectives adopted by the reform proposals.
Recently the Egyptian government grew weary of supporting its prison population. As
highlighted by judge AbdelHakam, the expenditures on debt prisoners after the devaluation of
currency amounted to an average of 3,000-3,500. This amount totales to around 192 million EGP
per month227. Furthermore, it would seem from comments by members of parliament and the
judge AbdelHakam that prisons are overpopulated with several distinct types of prisoners. The
government does not want the interaction between prisoners of poverty with political and
Islamist prisoners. As a result, the government is continually building new prisons to
accommodate the prisoners of poverty and the political prisoners. The main motivation
supporting the amendments is the decrease in government expenditures. Therefore, the legal
frameworks proposed seek to obtain a higher government surplus when dealing with prisoners of
poverty.
The reform amendments proposed do not tackle how criminal law treats debtors; it
tackles how the implementation of punishment is exercised228. This approach would force
debtors into forced labor to repay their debts, they would also be responsible for covering their
expenses. This approach is extremely beneficial for the government, it allows for the prisoners to
use one third of their given salary to satisfy their basic needs such as transportation and
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Quote from interview with the submitter of the reform bill judge Abd el Hakam “Hunāk fihm ẖāṭiʾ limašrwʿ
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“There is a misunderstanding regarding the law, the change is with regards to the application of the punishment, it
still remains a crime.”
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sustenance. Considering the previous status of the debtors as victims of extreme poverty, the new
law has an implication of placing them in a poverty trap. Debtors working for the “good of the
country” would need to borrow in case they are unable to live off the salaries provided by the
government jobs. This action would place them in a continuous loop providing services for the
government and the private sector. The amendments wish the government to engage in a
capitalistic endeavour to profit from the structural inequality affecting the debtors.
Officials seem to link terms like “civil service” or working for the “public good” with
“community service”; while in reality the proposed reform attempts to place them in “debt
bondage”. Moreover, their situation before the reform constituted debt imprisonment over their
inability to fulfil civil contractual obligations. On the other hand, their situation after the reform .
What the new reforms propose is a form of “debt bondage”; this practice has been labelled by the
UN as a practice of “modern day slavery”.
Moreover, the law does not place any restrictions on creditor practices that lead many to
be indebted by higher amounts than the sale value nor does it account for the use of security
receipts as tools of trust than tools of credit. Through continually privileging the creditors with
inaction, the situation would effectively lead to higher accumulation of labor under the
government control as the cycle continues. The government would face logistical difficulties
accommodating a high number of forced labor. Furthermore, there is a diversity amongst those
who fall in debt, forcing them in specific jobs would require knowledge of experience, age,
ability to do work, family status and dependents. Finally, reformers seem to forget that Egypt is a
developing country facing high inflation and poverty rates. The law seems to be targeting those
who deserve government support; it targets those who suffer from structural injustices and
inequalities such as the elderly and women. The ILO published a report highlighting that forced
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labor generates around 150 billion USD profits a year229. It would seem that reformers have
focused on two mandates and have rejected any other consideration. They aim to allow the state
to profiteer from poverty and keep the prisons cheaply maintained.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis attempted to engage with the puzzle of Egyptian
underdevelopment. This engagement revolved around the role of law as a tool of economic
development. The first chapter had two objectives. First, it aimed to flush out the rationale of
using law in the context of development. In doing so it introduced how law is conceptualized as a
tool of efficiency in favor of businessmen and investors. Moreover, it had highlighted how that
approach emphasizing efficiency is incoherent and contradictory. The second objective aimed to
highlight how the conception of law as “efficient” has operated in practice. I have divided the
periods of reforms into several periods to avoid totalizing the mechanisms and approaches to
reforms. In each period of lega lreform there was a reemergence of a popular narrative that has
constantly survived the failures of the Egyptian economy. This popular narrative adhered to a
false perception of the public and private sphere. In doing so it has attempted to privilege the
private sector and have placed it in the position of a “savior” that is capable of increasing the
well-being of society. I had argued that law became a constitutive part in Egypt’s plan to
develop. However, the role played by law privileges the savior figure have ended up with
disastrous results.
The second chapter aimed to counter both the narrative of “partial reform” and the value
of the “rule of law” as neoliberally conceived. This was conducted through a three level analysis:
the first part of the analysis examined macroeconomic indicators and the role of law in
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privileging non-productive sectors. The second part examined how the reform is articulated in
local context through repression. This repression occurs through laws/regulations that
disadvantage certain groups based on their ability to exert coercion upon the state. The third level
of analysis examined how institutional arrangements allowed for different privileges between
different actors in the “private sphere”; a phenomena coined by Adly as “cleft capitalism”. This
arrangement led certain sectors to have a superior productive ability through preferential legal
factors.
In the last chapter, I have examined another aspect of the reform that provided more
ammunition to the savior’s arsenal against segments of the population that are in dire need of
liquidity. In doing so, this part of reform “The New Commercial Law” included the participation
of the state as a tool of incarceration that adds to the value of certain legal papers(checks) that are
used in transactions. I have highlighted how most of those transactions could face an exception
based on a judge’s understanding of context. This exception would avoid the debtors' prison
sentence. However, the new law limited the judges’ ability to examine the contexts of the debtors
and removed them from the jurisdiction of the civil law into a body of law that would guarantee
their incarceration.
Furthermore, I had also examined the new reform proposals to alleviate the situation of
the debtors. The new reforms rely on a false narrative that attempts to criminalize vulnerable
populations. In doing so the reform attempts to privilege the savior figure by maintaining the
savior status of the law while changing its applications. This rationale of reforms falls within the
practices of the predatory state that attempts to disadvantage vulnerable populations while
maintains the power of dominant groups and external interests. I have argued that governments'
reforms will further exacerbate the issue of the debtors unless measures are taken to either place
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the debtors from those circumstances under civil law jurisdiction or limit the privileges of
creditors.
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